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Introduction 
 
Left terrorism in Germany in the 70’s and 80’s was a polarizing issue and continues to be so. 
Different narratives compete for dominance in interpreting the acts of the RAF and other 
terrorist groups. Most of them focus in some form on the dichotomy of terrorist acts and state 
reaction. One narrative, dominant in major parts of the left and the liberal left since the 70’s , 
has acknowledged and condemned the criminal character of the RAF’s terrorist acts, but has 
put its focus on the state reaction, which it has perceived as being excessive, following an 
authoritarian political agenda and reducing civil liberties. The dominant narrative on the 
political right and in important parts of the SPD has portrayed the RAF as an overall threat to 
the survival of the state, necessitating and justifying a forceful reaction. These two narratives 
differ not only in regard to their assessment of the state reaction, but also in how they 
characterize the development of terrorism laws. The “left” narrative has described and 
continues to describe the development of terrorism laws as an ongoing reduction of civil 
liberties. The “right” narrative suggests that reductions of civil liberties by terrorism laws are 
mostly temporary and disappear when the terrorist threat subsides. This concept is often based 
on the metaphoric assumption that security and liberty are in some sort of balance, as Ronald 
Dworkin pointed out.1  
 
By describing the above-mentioned narratives as “left” and “right”, I already indicated that 
they do not merely serve an analytical function, but have been and continue to be employed in 
public debate to substantiate a political agenda. The concept of “terrorism” – defined by the 
narrative surrounding it – has a specific discursive function. However, terrorism laws are not 
merely an appendage to (anti-)terrorism politics, just as the law is not merely an appendage to 
politics in general. Rather – following Luhmann – politics and the law, although they interact 
and influence each other, are distinct systems following their own rules of continuity, 
reproduction and development. Looking at the history of terrorism and state reaction in 
Germany from this perspective I suggest that not a singular, but a multitude of development 
patterns are to be discovered. It may be worthwhile to describe the development of terrorism 
laws as a bundle of (legal, political, social) processes having their own distinctive – 
sometimes complementing, sometimes competing – histories. By this, I do not wish to suggest 
that more straightforward, mono-causal narratives (such as the ones outlined above) are less 
valid than the one that I present. However, I consider it important to be clear about their 
                                                 
1 Ronald Dworkin: The Threat to Patriotism, in: The New York Review of Books (2002) Vol. 49 No. 3 
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functions in political discourse. Giving account of an asynchronous and multi-causal 
development of terrorism laws in Germany shall hint at the great number and the complexity 
of processes that it has been influenced by.  
 
This thesis aims at providing a systematic analysis of the development of the major terrorism 
laws enacted during the RAF period and includes both the specific legal developments and the 
connected general political discourses. Each of the six legal measures is discussed separately. 
The final chapter attempts to establish common traits in the development of the different anti-
terrorism laws. In particular, it analyzes the Kontaktsperregesetz, Kronzeugenregelung, 
Lauschangriff, Rasterfahndung and the terrorism provision in the penal code (§ 129a StGB) 
and related provisions. Important provisions not covered due to space constraints concern the 
limitations of defence rights (Verteidigerausschluss). Additionally, I included a chapter on the 
Radikalenerlass. While the Radikalenerlass does not constitute terrorism legislation per se, I 
believe that it provides major insights into the de-normalizing structure of the security debate 
in Germany in general. 
 
So far, very little has been published on the legal dimension of Germany’s anti-terrorism 
efforts from a historic point of view, and no systematic analysis of relevant legal 
developments has been attempted yet. Therefore, this thesis mostly relies on primary sources. 
The reconstruction of the legal developments of the researched measures and the connected 
political debates is mainly based on articles from Der Spiegel, a weekly journal that had a left-
liberal orientation until the mid-90’s. Additionally, I carried out a broad research in a variety 
of professional legal journals, including the Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, the Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift and the Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik. Finally, I analyzed two 
political publications: Kursbuch, the major journal for the radical and non-orthodox left in the 
70’s, and Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, a political science journal of 
predominantly social democratic orientation. While the Spiegel-research provided the 
structural backbone of the thesis and was the main source for the reconstruction of the 
political discourse, the legal research gave an overview of the relevant legal debates. Finally, 
Kursbuch and Blätter provided an insight into the critical opinions on the development of 
terrorism laws in Germany. 
 
Earlier drafts of this thesis included a larger chapter on the theoretical side of the terrorism 
discourse. However, the number of publications that perform a discourse analysis of 
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“terrorism” is vast and has – in my view – already comprehensively substantiated the 
argument that “terrorism” is not a neutral term but has a discursive and political function.2 I 
therefore decided to limit the theoretical part to a minimum and instead fully focus on the 
analysis of the development of terrorism laws in Germany in an attempt to show how the 
terrorism discourse plays out in practice. By this, I believe that I have produced a piece of 
original research instead of merely echoing existing research efforts.  
 
All translations from German sources are my own. 
 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive overview, see for example Thomas Riegler: Terrorismus. 9/11 im Kontext: Akteure, 
Strukturen, Entwicklungslinien, Dissertation Wien 2007 
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Terrorism as discourse 
 
Richard Jackson writes that “terrorism discourse – the terms, assumptions, labels, categories 
and narratives used to describe and explain terrorism – has emerged as one of the most 
important political discourses of the modern era (…).”3 The use of the term “terrorism” has 
always been contested. The struggle to find a scientific definition – referred to invariably by 
textbooks on terrorism4 – reflects the political struggle behind the power of naming somebody 
or something “terrorist”. Being labelled a terrorist was and is “completely unattractive”5 for 
the denominated person or group and has severe legal and political consequences. The term 
“terrorism” contains a strong moral judgement.6 It is thus highly contested and shifting in its 
content. Eugene Walter: “Ever since the French Revolution, ‘terrorist’ has been an epithet to 
fasten on a political enemy. Burke and his followers have said that if you scratch an 
ideologue, you will find a terrorist. On the other hand, revolutionary radicals have tended to 
think of terror as a defensive manoeuvre against counterrevolutionary forces. Both points of 
view are quick to label almost any kind of violence exercised by their opponents as 
terrorism.”7 The academic terrorism debate does not solve the struggle with regard to the 
denomination by applying a neutral definition, but reproduces the power struggle in 
definitions within the academic sphere. Noam Chomsky argues that “it is important to bear in 
mind that the term ‘terrorism’ is commonly used as a term of abuse, not accurate description. 
There are official definitions of “terrorism”, for example, those of the US and British 
governments, which are quite similar. But they are not used, because they do not distinguish 
between good and bad varieties of terrorism. That distinction is determined by the agent of the 
crime, not its character. It is close to a historical universal that our terrorism against them is 
right and just (whoever “we” happen to be), while their terrorism against us is an outrage. As 
long as that practice is adopted, discussion of terrorism is not serious. It is no more than a 
                                                 
3 Richard Jackson: Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse, in: 
Government and Opposition (2007) Vol. 42 No. 3, p. 394 
4 Jeffrey Addicott: Terrorism Law. Materials, cases, comments. Tucson 2007, p. 1; Walter Laqueur: Terrorismus, 
Frankfurt am Main 1987; Eckart Klein: Die Herausforderung durch den internationalen Terrorismus – Hört hier 
das Völkerrecht auf?, in: Josef Isensee (ed.): Der Terror, der Staat und das Recht, Berlin 2004, p. 10; Klaus 
Weinhauer: Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik der Siebzigerjahre. Aspekte einer Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte 
der Inneren Sicherheit, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte (2004) No. 44, p. 221  
5 Thomas Riegler: Terrorismus. 9/11 im Kontext: Akteure, Strukturen, Entwicklungslinien, Dissertation Wien 
2007, p. 17 
6 Henner Hess: Terrorismus und Terrorismus-Diskurs, in: Angriff auf das Herz des Staates (Vol. 1), Frankfurt 
am Main 1988, p. 55 
7 Eugene Walter, Terror and Resistance. A Study of Political Violence, Oxford 1969, p. 4 
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form of propaganda and apologetics.”8 Historian Charles Townshend argues that terrorism is 
“a labelling, because ‘terrorist’ is a description that has almost never been voluntarily adopted 
by any individual or group. It is applied to them by others, first and foremost by the 
governments of the states they attack. States have not been slow to brand violent opponents 
with this title, with its clear implications of inhumanity, criminality and – perhaps most 
crucial – lack of real political support.”9 In this sense, the term terrorism serves a particular 
discursive function of delegitimizing the denoted group or movement.  
 
Many authors point out that “terrorism” as a phenomenon describes a broad set of institutions, 
including all institutions of state reaction as well. “State and society have not remained 
unaffected by ‘terrorism.’ […] ‘Terrorism’ has become an institution on a continuing basis. 
This institution does not merely encompass a few figures in the underground, but also the 
impressive apparatus of (police, judicial, legal and media) reaction to it – including the 
production of printed matters.”10 Research needs, Klaus Weinhauer argues, to take account of 
the “close interplay between terrorism and the state.”11 
 
The process of de-legitimization has a political and a legal side. Before turning to the legal 
aspect, the part below gives two examples of the political de-legitimizing function of the 
terrorism discourse. 
Terrorism discourse: the case of SDS 
 
Terrorism discourse in Germany started back in the 60’s, years before the first terrorist attack 
by the RAF. Until the mid-60’s, the term “terror” or “terrorism” did not seem to be commonly 
used in domestic discourse. The term was mainly used to describe the Nazi- and the Stalin-
regime and struggles in the decolonialization process, e.g. in Algeria. Additionally, the term 
was used by the DDR to decry the political system in Western Germany.12 When, however, 
student protests erupted in West Berlin in 1967, they were increasingly called “terror” by the 
right-wing press. After student Benno Ohnesorg was shot by a police officer in June 1967 
during a demonstration against the Persian Shah and 24 demonstrators were severely 
wounded, the Berliner Zeitung – part of the Springer media conglomerate – wrote the 
                                                 
8 On Israel, the US and Turkey. Noam Chomsky interviewed by Sabahattin Atas, September 2003, online: 
www.chomsky.info/interviews/200309--.htm (retrieved 24.3.2008) 
9 Charles Townshend: Terrorismus, Stuttgart 2005, p. 3 
10 Henner Hess et al.: Vorbemerkung, Angriff auf das Herz des Staates (Vol. 1), Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 10 
11 Klaus Weinhauer (2004), p. 222 
12 Unter Naturschutz, in: Der Spiegel 49/1962, 05.12.1962, p. 66 
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headline: “If they produce terror, they need to accept a tough response.”13 Student 
organizations called the killing a “terror measure by the police of West Berlin.” And Bild – 
also owned by Springer – wrote on the following day: “Yesterday stupid and malicious 
muddle heads have tried for the first time to bring terror to the free part of Berlin.” Even 
Rudolf Augstein, editor of the left-liberal journal Der Spiegel – called the protests in West-
Berlin “organized terror.”14 
 
When student leader Rudi Dutschke and eight other demonstrators entered a church to 
demonstrate for peace in Vietnam in late 1967 and Dutschke was injured by a church-goer, 
the CDU youth wing Junge Union called the action – not the attack on Dutschke – “terror.”15  
 
In 1968, “terror” became the single most important word of the right and the political 
establishment to fight against student protesters and served as a legitimization of the excessive 
use of police violence. In January 1968, a demonstration against a rise in ticket prices for 
public transport in Bremen was dispersed by the massive use of police violence. Hans 
Koschnick, the SPD Major of Bremen supported tough police measures, arguing that “terror 
can only be overcome with violence.”16 Accordingly, the demonstration of about 50 high 
school students was violently dispersed by the police. This caused a major anti-police 
demonstration, as Der Spiegel reported, leading to the damage of hundreds of buses and 
trams. When 500 students demonstrated in the FU Berlin and blocked the doors of deanery, 
Rector Ewald Harndt called it “brutal terror.”17 The right-wing press compared the student 
protests with the street terror conducted by the SA between 1930 and 1933, calling the 
demonstrators “red fascists” and the smashing of windows “stoning democracy to death.”18 
 
However, the student movement, and in particular its main organization SDS and its most 
prominent figure Rudi Dutschke, had explicitly opposed the use of violence from the 
beginning (Wolfgang Kraushaar argues, however, that Dutschke had an “ambivalent” relation 
to violence). After the first criticism of the student protest’s alleged aggressiveness, the 
student movement attempted to distinguish between ‘violence against persons’ and ‘violence 
against objects’. While the first was fully opposed, the second was sometimes deemed 
                                                 
13 Knüppel frei, in: Der Spiegel 25/1967, 12.06.1967, p. 41 
14 Die Revolution und ihr ABC, in: Der Spiegel 32/1967, 31.07.1967, p. 14 
15 Sache der Elenden, in: Der Spiegel 01/1968, 01.01.1968, p. 39 
16 Großer Graben, in: Der Spiegel 04/1968, 22.01.1968, p. 28 
17 Licht aus, in: Der Spiegel 06/1968, 05.02.1968, p. 56 
18 Zahltag, in: Der Spiegel 07/1968, 12.02.1968, p. 32 
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justified by the circumstances. Especially Dutschke clearly opposed the use of violence in 
Germany. In his famous discussion with Ernst Bloch at the Protestant Academy in Bad Boll19 
Dutschke stated: “In the current state of capitalism violence against persons cannot be 
justified as revolutionary violence. In the current phase, as far as I can see, I can imagine 
terror only as an inhuman, uncontrolled machinery, and no longer directed against persons 
[…] I propose that tyrannicide is still legitimate. But to use such practices against Kiesinger, 
Brandt or other character masks is wrong, barbarous and counter-revolutionary. They are 
completely exchangeable, and for us this form of direct violence against character masks is 
completely inadequate and wrong.”20  
 
In April 1968, Rudi Dutschke was shot and severely injured.21 In the following protests 
(“Osterunruhen”), a photographer and a student were killed, allegedly by rocks thrown by 
protesters (later evidence suggests that the student, Rüdiger Schreck, was in fact killed by the 
police).22 The SDS leaders Karl Dietrich Wolff und Frank Wolff, defending themselves 
against the accusation that they were “anarcho-revolutionary terrorists”, gave the following 
statement on the use of violence in an interview with Der Spiegel: “There have been situations 
where throwing rocks is justified, for example if you do not want to give yourself up to police 
who wish to beat you unscrupulously.” 23 Asked what the SDS considered as too much 
violence, they replied: “The terror of some individuals against the population. In Berlin 
somebody fought against car owners by randomly slashing tyres of parked cars. This must be 
called pathological.” In an interview a month after he was shot, Dutschke confirmed his 
opposition to the use of violence by the student movement: “In our time, terrorist violence 
against people in Western metropolises is no longer necessary.”24 Some demonstrations in 
1968 were, however, accompanied by rocks thrown at police officers – violence clearly 
directed against persons, not objects.25 The demonstration on occasion of the process against 
APO-lawyer (and later RAF terrorist) Horst Mahler caused 121 casualties among police 
officers. 
 
                                                 
19 Schwierigkeiten beim Aufrechtgehen, in: Der Spiegel 08/1968, 19.02.1968, p. 30 
20 Neues in Deutschland, in: Der Spiegel 08/1968, 19.02.1968, p. 32 
21 Sebastian Scheerer: Deutschland: Die ausgebürgerte Linke, in: Angriff auf das Herz des Staates (Vol. 1), p. 
275 
22 Zwei vergessene 68er-Opfer, in: BR-online, 18.3.2008, online: http://www.br-
online.de/kultur/gesellschaft/die-68er-40-jahre-danach-DID1202381431011/68er-osterunruhen-klaus-frings-
ruediger-schreck-ID1205848656242.xml (retrieved 30 June 2008) 
23 „Ohne uns wäre es viel schlimmer gekommen“, in: Der Spiegel, 17/1968, 22.04.1968, p. 36 
24 Da man sie schlagen wird, kennen sie das Risiko“, in: Der Spiegel, 20/1968, 13.05.1968, p. 36 
25 Nach vorn geträumt, in: Der Spiegel 46/1968, 11.11.1968, p. 67 
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In 1968, the term “terror” was sometimes employed by student protesters to describe their 
own actions.26 For the most part, this choice of words should be, I believe, understood as a 
reaction by the APO to the dominant allegations by the establishment and the right. To some 
limited extent, it might have served as a genuine attempt to describe the movement’s strategy 
to disrupt or provoke the public order, especially when street militancy became a more 
deliberately employed method of APO politics. The SDS also employed the term “terror” as a 
fighting word against their opponents. A leaflet in Mainz published after the attack on 
Dutschke read: “If a media conglomerate uses its powers to defame, denunciate and hound 
minorities, this does not only constitute media dictatorship, but also uses direct terror against 
these minorities.”27 A leaflet from early 1969 demanded: “terrorize the terrorists.” 28 
However, the term “terror” was dominantly employed by the political establishment (SPD, 
CDU/CSU and the right-wing press) to delegitimize the student protest movement. 
 
The rejection of the student movement and its demands and the aggressive use of police 
violence was to some extent fuelled by a backward, authoritarian belief system. This seems to 
be the main reason for the fact that demonstrations were “perceived as irresponsible idleness 
and terror,” as Berlin professor Wilhelm Weischedel argued, according to Der Spiegel.29 
 
A growing militancy on the part of the SDS and the APO can be observed from late 1968 
on.30 The use of violence was increasingly legitimized in the leftist discourse. Daniel Cohn-
Bendit, a student leader, said: “Comrade Martin Luther King is in little demand. We need an 
offensive of violence.”31 The student protest movement had been previously dominated by the 
concept of “passive violence”, sit-ins, walk-ins and blockades in the style of the student 
protests in Berkeley and of Martin Luther King’s civil rights movement. Dissent on the use of 
violence was one of the reasons why the radical left split into a “black line” (anarchists, 
Maoists) and a “red line” (orthodox communists, labour union youth, socialists and liberals) 
who continued to reject all forms of violence. 
 
                                                 
26 Zur Sache, Schätzchen, in: Der Spiegel 19/1968, 06.05.1968, p. 67 
27 „Gefahr für uns alle“, in: Der Spiegel 19/1968, 06.05.1968, p. 42 
28 Wann und wie, in: Der Spiegel 07/1969, 10.02.1969, p. 23 
29 Zur Sonne, in: Der Spiegel 26/1968, 24.06.1968, p. 38 
30 Wann und wie, in: Der Spiegel 07/1969, 10.02.1969, p. 23 
31 Wann und wie, in: Der Spiegel 07/1969, 10.02.1969, p.  23 
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The arson attack in April 1968 on two warehouses in Frankfurt by the later RAF terrorists 
Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Thorwald Proll und Horst Söhnlein was fully rejected by 
the SDS leadership.32  
 
In the election campaign of 1969, the CDU/CSU advocated harsh measures against the APO 
militancy. Franz-Joseph Strauss (CSU) demanded that “the order of the state needs to be 
guaranteed by all means of executive power. The terror must be finally broken.”33 
 
The development of a militant (but non-terrorist) fraction of the APO in the following years is 
not examined by this thesis. The chapter shows, however, that a “terror discourse” had existed 
in Germany well before a terrorist group came into existence, as the RAF was founded only in 
1970.34 The terror discourse was used by the political establishment –mostly by the 
CDU/CSU and the right-wing press, but also by the SPD – in order to delegitimize the student 
movement. This chapter shows that the “terror” allegation was already used in a phase (1967) 
that was characterized by non-violent protests. Heinz Steinert argues that “it becomes obvious 
that the whole ‘left’ was seen as illegitimate in Germany, and ‘terrorism’ was an opportune 
occasion to also de-legalize the ‘sympathizer-swamp’. […] for this use of ‘terrorism’ and its 
‘history’ it is necessary to reconstruct the relation between the ‘student movement’ and 
‘terrorism’ in such a form that ‘terrorism’ was only the symptom for something already rooted 
in the ‘student movement.’”35 
Terrorism discourse: sympathizers 
 
Terrorism discourse was employed in the political discourse to discredit political opponents. 
A key concept to discredit a large swathe of left-liberal intellectuals and leftist groups was the 
concept of the “terrorism sympathizer.” In its core meaning, “sympathizer” described a group 
of people helping or willing to help RAF terrorists, e.g. by handing over their passports, 
providing money, supplies or a place to sleep. However, the term “sympathizer” was 
employed from the outset to denounce persons who did not distance themselves strong 
                                                 
32 Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort“, in: Der Spiegel 41/1977, 03.10.1977, p. 28; Angriff und Machtkampf, in: 
Der Spiegel 26/1969, 23.06.1969, p. 54 
33 Von Strauss, Tieren und anderen Menschen, in: Der Spiegel 34/1969, 18.08.1969, p. 16; Knüppel und Hunde, 
in: Der Spiegel 37/1969, 08.09.1969, p. 62 
34 Sebastian Scheerer (1988), p. 293 
35 Heinz Steinert: Erinnerung an den „linken Terrorismus“, in: Angriff auf das Herz des Staates (Vol. 1), 
Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 17 
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enough from the RAF or who used arguments – e.g. against police methods – that were 
allegedly playing down the RAF.36 
 
One of the first prominent victims of the sympathizer-discourse was author and Nobel-prize 
laureate Heinrich Böll. In January 1972 – before the RAF had started their first major terrorist 
operation, the bombings of May 197237 – he published the commentary “Does Ulrike 
[Meinhof] want mercy or free passage?” in Der Spiegel.38 He argued that the RAF hysteria 
led by the right-wing media, especially the Bild, and many politicians was disproportional to 
the group’s real danger potential and was responsible for extending and prolonging the 
group’s activities.39 Böll accused the Bild of fascism while at the same time rejecting the 
RAF’s activities, calling them “a war against society.” He argued that – in order to end the 
group’s activity – it was necessary to offer the right to free passage and to due public process 
to Meinhof. 
 
Subsequently, Böll was accused by the Springer newspapers, Bild and Welt, of defending the 
RAF and demanding impunity for Meinhof.40 The Quick, a right-wing tabloid, wrote: “The 
Bölls are worse than Baader-Meinhof.”41 
 
The campaign against Böll lasted many months.42 Right-wing newspapers such as the Welt 
accused the student and protest movement of the 60’s of being responsible for RAF’s 
terrorism. The Welt wrote: “The sympathizers of the gang [RAF, ck] need to be put in the 
spotlight.”43 The CDU politician Friedrich Vogel claimed that “the terrorists can move like 
fish in the water of the left-affiliated parties.”44 In November 1974, after the murder of court 
president Günter von Drenkmann, Franz-Josef Strauss argued: “I would like to know how 
many sympathizers of the Baader-Meinhof crimes are members of the SPD and FDP 
parliamentary fraction in Bonn. It is quite a bunch.”45  
                                                 
36 Balz, Hanno: Der „Sympathisanten“-Diskurs im „Deutschen Herbst“, in: Klaus Weinhauer (ed.): Terrorismus 
in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt am Main 2006, p. 320; Thomas Riegler (2007), p. 377; Sebastian Scherer 
(1988) 
37 Sebastian Scheerer (1988), p. 348 
38 Heinrich Böll: „Will Ulrike Gnade oder freies Geleit?“, in: Der Spiegel 03/1972, 10.01.1972, p. 54 
39 Hermann Vinke: Mit zweierlei Maß. Die deutsche Reaktion auf den Terror von rechts. Eine Dokumentation, 
Hamburg 1981, p. 93 
40 Zitate, in: Der Spiegel 04/1972, 17.01.1972, p. 118 
41 „Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort“, in: Der Spiegel 41/1977, 03.10.1977, p. 28 
42 Peter Schneider: Der Sand an Baaders Schuhen, in: Kursbuch (1978) No. 51, p. 9 
43 „Sollen wir mit Blumen kommen?“, in: Der Spiegel 27/1972, 26.06.1972, p. 60 
44 Zucker vor der Hoftür, in: Der Spiegel 25/1972, 12.06.1972, p. 31 
45 „Den Rechtsstaat retten – blödes Zeug“, in: Der Spiegel 11/1975, 10.03.1975, p. 19 
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After the murder of federal prosecutor Siegfried Buback in April 1977, the text “Buback – an 
obituary” was published in a student magazine in Göttingen under the pseudonym 
“Mescalero.” The text – written by Klaus Hülbrock, who identified himself as the author 25 
years later – became a colossal scandal and sparked a major debate on sympathizers of the 
RAF terror. In the text, Hülbrock wrote that he “at first felt secret joy after the murder. […] I 
have heard [Buback’s] incitements again and again. I know that he played an immense role in 
the prosecution, criminalization and torture of leftists.” In the second part of the text, the 
author criticised and distanced himself from the murder: “Our aim, a society without terror 
and violence […] does not justify all means, only some. Our path to socialism (or anarchy) 
cannot cross over dead bodies.”46 Calling the murder of Buback an “Abschuss”, a word which 
suggests the killing of an animal rather than the murder of a person, the text remained deeply 
ambiguous.  
 
In public debate, politicians and right-wing newspapers were quoting only the first part of the 
text, without mentioning the criticism and rejection of the murder in the second. The text led 
to criminal investigations against the student union in Göttingen. In August, 43 university 
professors jointly published the text.47 Their intention was to make the complete text public.48 
The professors were criticised by most parts of the media for their lack of distance from the 
text, but were also accused of being sympathizers of terror by the right-wing press.  
 
The dictum of the “secret joy” became the dominant element in the discourse on sympathizers 
in the following months.49 After the kidnapping and murder of Hanns-Martin Schleyer and the 
hijacking of the Landshut airplane in September 1977, criticism of alleged terrorist 
sympathizers grew sharply.50 The Prime Minister of Rheinland-Pfalz, Bernhard Vogel (CDU) 
said that “somebody may already be a sympathizer when he says Baader/Meinhof-group 
instead of –gang.”51 The SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt spoke of “intellectual pioneers [of 
terrorism, ck] that live in some of the institutions and the media of our society.” The 
CDU/CSU politicians attempted particularly to include the FDP and the SPD in the group of 
                                                 
46 „Andere Gewalt als Al Capone“, in: Der Spiegel 34/1977, 15.08.1977, p. 28 
47 43 Professoren, in: Der Spiegel 34/1977, 15.08.1977, p. 27 
48 Nur Anstandsregeln verletzt?, in: Der Spiegel 34/1977, 15.08.1977, p. 26 
49 Hans Adamo: Vorgebliche und tatsächliche Ursachen des Terrorismus, in: Blätter für deutsche und 
internationale Politik (1977) No. 12, p. 1436; Gerard Braunthal: Political loyalty and public service in West 
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alleged sympathizers. The CSU parliamentarian Günther Müller claimed that broad parts of 
the governmental parties “felt not only secret joy that our system is being crushed.”52 In 
October 1977, CDU general secretary Heiner Geißler presented a “terrorism documentation” 
which contained quotes of (among others) Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Interior Minister 
Maihofer and the author Heinrich Böll, all of whom were allegedly playing down terrorism.53 
The documentation was criticised even within Geißler’s own party as denunciatory. 
 
Students and university professors were the focus of the sympathizer-debate. Student 
representative bodies (AStAs) were criticized for their alleged sympathizer role and some of 
them were shut down, although the German AStAs were almost completely controlled by 
socialist, liberal and communist student organizations – groups that explicitly opposed the use 
of violence.54 The German Conference of Catholic Bishops warned that “for many years 
theories of refusal and violence” had been taught at universities, and “terrorists had received 
their ideological munitions there.”55 The conservative “Union Freedom of Science” (Union 
Freiheit der Wissenschaft) claimed that demonstrations for more political rights for student 
unions already constituted “a preliminary state of the terrorism that emanates from Germany’s 
universities.”56 Especially after the Mescalero affair, attention also turned to the role of leftist 
professors, accused of creating or legitimizing terrorism.  
 
Der Spiegel analyzed the sympathizer-debate as follows: “Everybody is a sympathizer who is 
called one. The term is a hollow phrase, full of suspicion and without any precision. This 
blurred term has become a weapon of language in the political fight. In its inconsistent use, it 
covers the offender who actively supports crimes, but cannot distinguish him from those who 
comprehend the pretended political motive without endorsing their actions. And it cannot 
distinguish between supporters of violence and those who call themselves ‘critics of the 
system’ or think of themselves as ‘revolutionary’ but oppose violence. And it does not 
distinguish between those who sympathize with terrorism and those who doubt the legality of 
how the state reacts to terrorism.”57 
 
                                                 
52 Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort I, in: Der Spiegel 41/1977, 03.10.1977, p.  28 
53 Kohls Hagen, in: Der Spiegel 43/1977, 17.10.1977, p. 41 
54 Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort III, in: Der Spiegel 43/1977, 17.10.1977, p. 203 
55 Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort III, in: Der Spiegel 43/1977, 17.10.1977, p. 203 
56 Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort III, in: Der Spiegel 43/1977, 17.10.1977, p. 203 
57 Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort I, in: Der Spiegel 41/1977, 03.10.1977, p. 28 
 15
However, especially those intellectuals most ferociously attacked for being sympathizers or at 
least for being “intellectual pioneers” of terrorism – such as Günther Grass, Heinrich Böll, 
Kurt Scharf, Helmut Gollwitzer58 or Heinrich Albertz – explicitly rejected the use of violence 
by the left from early on. 
 
After 1972, the group of sympathizer-supporters of the RAF was estimated to be a few 
thousand at most. They almost exclusively belonged to the anarchist scene or the K-groups.59 
The first “supporter-generation” had continued to include intellectuals such as Peter Brückner. 
But after the first terrorist attacks of 1972, this middle-class supporter group completely 
eroded.60 Both the left-liberal establishment and the “red line” of the student movement spoke 
out against the use of violence and terrorism from early on. However, the existence of a small 
anarchist scene that sympathized with (or – as in the case of the Mescalero – did not 
sufficiently reject) terrorist violence was used to denunciate the liberal and the social 
democratic establishment by the right. In 1978 and afterwards, the use of the sympathizer 
allegation was strongly reduced.61 
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Terrorism laws in Germany enacted during the RAF period 
Kronzeugenregelung – the leniency law 
 
A leniency law (Kronzeugenregelung) provides that a person charged with a crime who 
testifies against his or her accomplices may receive a reduced sentence if the testimony leads 
to a conviction. Germany did not have a leniency law until 1981 (for drug offences) and 1989 
(for terrorism charges).  
 
Passing a leniency law was first considered in the mid-seventies, when evidence against the 
first RAF-generation turned out to be hard to acquire. Critics – such as federal prosecutor and 
later RAF-victim Siegfried Buback – argued that a leniency law was not necessary from a 
practical point of view and, more generally, would violate the rule of law.62 Der Spiegel 
reported that – after initial excitement – opposition to the Kronzeugenregelung within the 
governing and the opposition parties grew stronger.63 The SPD-FDP government finally 
decided not to push through the leniency law in early 1976 after a year-long parliamentary 
debate and three draft bills64, not least due to discouraging experiences with RAF witnesses of 
the past years, e.g. Hans-Peter Konieczny65 Gerhard Müller66 and Karl-Heinz Ruhland.67  
 
Gerhard Müller, who was arrested in 1972 together with Ulrike Meinhof served as the prime 
witness in the Stammheim trials. The prosecution deemed him essential to reach a conviction, 
as they had difficulties in proving which RAF member had exactly participated in which 
crimes. 68 Being an insider, Müller could provide this information. In return, the prosecution – 
presumably – dropped parts of the charges, although evidence came up later that connected 
him to the murder of police officer Norbert Schmid69 and to the attack on a US military 
building in 1972. His testimony led to a number of life sentences for RAF members. Müller 
had to serve only two thirds of his ten year prison sentence. Afterwards he probably entered a 
witness-protection program, according to the Süddeutsche Zeitung. It is therefore likely that 
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the federal prosecution applied a leniency arrangement without a legal basis, preventing a 
murder accusation from being prosecuted.  
 
During the Stammheim trials, the court and the defence lawyers were shown only parts of the 
protocols of Müller’s interrogation, other parts were kept secret. These parts remain lost until 
today, as recent investigations have shown. 70 The undisclosed parts of the interrogation 
protocols were seemingly destroyed in 1996 by the federal prosecution office, more than ten 
years before they were to be de-classified, and no copies of these documents have been 
handed to the national archive.  
 
Müller’s testimony was one of the reasons that led commentators to the conclusion that the 
Stammheim trial was “a caricature of a trial and of the rule of law,”71 Der Spiegel argued: 
“The deal with Gerhard Müller is an intentional breach of the law.”72 The testimony turned 
into a veritable source of embarrassment for the federal prosecution and the federal criminal 
agency (BKA). The BKA and the federal prosecution were accused of holding back 
information from the court and of hiding crucial evidence.73 
 
Karl-Heinz Ruhland was a former RAF member who testified against other RAF members. 
He was granted a reduced sentence of two and a half years instead of four as a reward. He 
later claimed that he had been promised protection, money and a reduced sentence by the 
police in exchange for his testimony, but had neither received protection nor a new identity 
after his release from prison.74 Ruhland commented publicly that he would have never 
testified against his accomplices if he had known how little support he would have received 
from the state, further disavowing the prosecution and the BKA. 
 
While a real Kronzeugenregelung did not become law until ten years later, a growing shift in 
court and prosecution practice can be observed. This included, first and foremost, the use of 
witness testimony without the possibility of the defence – or even the judge – to interrogate 
the witness. This practice was established, supposedly, for security reasons. Gerhard Müller’s 
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testimony, for example, was brought by the prosecution in a trial against a Frankfurt professor 
who had allegedly supported Ulrike Meinhof.75 The defence was denied the right to cross-
examine Müller. The testimony of ex-RAF members such as Müller, Hans-Joachim Dellwo 
and Volker Speitel was used in this way in over a half-dozen cases until 1980.76  
 
In 1980, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) decided that it was legal to deny the 
right of the defence to cross-examine a witness if justified by security reasons or intelligence 
interests.77 In these cases, the only right of the defence would be to prepare questions in 
writing that the judge would later ask the witness.78 But as the prosecution had the possibility 
to keep the identity of the witness – an ex-terrorist, a police informer or an undercover agent –  
undisclosed, this right of defence amounted to very little. Furthermore, the prosecution was 
given the right to refuse a cross-examination by the defence and to make use of earlier police 
interrogation protocols or to let police officers testify who had previously interrogated the 
witness.79 This was criticized as a massive reduction of defence laws and as a breach of the 
constitution by legal scholars.80  
 
The decision of the Federal Court of Justice was not only influenced by the RAF-processes, 
but also by a debate that had started in 1980 on the practice of undercover agents and police 
informers in drug-related crimes.81 The early eighties to some extent brought a shift in how 
security-related laws were sold in public discourse by the government. Terrorism – being the 
primary issue in the security discourse in the 70’s – was partly replaced by the drug discourse. 
 
In early 1981, RAF terrorist Peter Jürgen Boock was arrested. The arrest led to a long-lasting 
struggle on how to deal with those persons who aimed at disengaging with the RAF. Peter 
Jürgen Boock – recruited as a teenager by Andreas Baader – was an RAF member from the 
mid-seventies until 1980, taking part in numerous terrorist actions such as the kidnapping of 
Hanns Martin Schleyer and the (failed) rocket attack on the office of the federal prosecution 
in Karlsruhe. Boock left the RAF in 1980. After his arrest, Boock also distanced himself 
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publicly from the RAF, renouncing violence and calling on its members to disengage with the 
RAF.82 However, like the majority of the arrested RAF members he refused to cooperate with 
the police or the prosecution.83 During 1981, a growing number of leading officials – among 
them Justice Minister Baum84 and BKA President Boge demanded that Boock should receive 
preferential treatment – such as better conditions of detention – as a visible recognition for his 
renunciation of violence.85 They hoped that this could push other RAF members to disengage 
with the group as well. The position was supported by the perception in the early 80’s that the 
RAF was weakened and disillusioned. It was argued that only an internal collapse of the 
organization – not police measures – could lead to an end to terrorist violence. Der Spiegel 
analyzed: “The outer pressure of the intense police activities welds the members of terrorist 
groups together. It furnishes them with pseudo-legitimacy for their counter-violence, 
countervails possible disintegrating powers and thus reinforces the groups’ potential. In 
contrast, the debate about those individuals who left the groups made the terrorists insecure 
and had corroding effects on the terrorist scene. This was not only confirmed by ex-terrorists 
such as Boock and Hans-Joachim Klein, but also by the angry and defaming reactions of 
ultra-left publications who called Boock and his helpers ‘traitors’.”86 
 
The position was opposed by federal prosecutor Kurt Rebmann, who demanded full and 
severe prosecution of all the RAF terrorists including those who had already denounced 
violence unless they cooperated with the prosecution.87 Earlier, the federal prosecution had 
tried to win Boock over as a witness. When Boock refused to testify against his accomplices, 
the federal prosecution tried to put pressure on him. They requested trial in Stammheim 
instead of Hamburg in order to isolate Boock from his family and his lawyer, who were all 
based in Hamburg. The prosecution insisted on relocation despite the fact that the judges in 
Stammheim objected.  
 
The conflict on how the state should deal with Boock was in fact a conflict between those 
aiming to find a political solution and those pushing to solve the terrorism problem by police 
means alone.  
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After the murder of diplomat Gerold von Braunmühl in 1986 the leniency law was again 
proposed by the liberal-conservative government as part of a bigger anti-terrorism package.88  
After devastating results in the regional elections, the FDP leadership decided to push for 
stronger security laws. 89 In an interview, FDP president Martin Bangemann proclaimed a 
“war” against the RAF and spoke out in favour of the leniency law. The FDP general 
convention, however, voted against the proposal.90 Similarly, an astounding majority of the 
legal establishments – most notably academics and attorneys – opposed the law. The report of 
the parliamentary hearing grew to over 400 pages long, and an overwhelming majority of 
experts spoke out against the measure.91 Additionally, a solid majority of 59% of the 
population opposed the leniency law, as polls showed.92 The anti-terrorism package was 
enacted without the leniency law in 1986.93 However, the Kronzeugenregelung was enacted 
only three years later in April 198994 despite the opposition of both the parliamentary justice 
and the interior committees.95  
 
Ten RAF members left the group in the early eighties and sought refuge in East Germany 
(they were called the “RAF-Aussteiger”). They were provided with new identities and – after 
being interrogated – were allowed to live unbothered by the authorities.96 In the early 80’s, 
especially between 1980 and 1982, East Germany actively supported the RAF by providing 
training and weapons.97 After 1982, East Germany reduced its support to the active RAF as it 
feared being accused of supporting international terrorism. However, the RAF-Aussteiger 
were allowed to stay.98 After the reunification in 1990 they were quickly exposed and 
arrested. Among those arrested were Susanne Albrecht, Sigrid Sternebeck, Silke Maier-Witt, 
Henning Beer and Werner Lotze.99 It was to these (ex-)terrorists that the Kronzeugenregelung 
was first applied.  
                                                 
88 Warum nicht auch Folter? in: Der Spiegel, 45/1986, 3.11.1986, p. 22 
89 Ein Notstandsgesetz für zwei Jahre?, in: Der Spiegel, 45/1986, 3.11.1986, p. 20 
90 Auf dem Suppenteller, in: Der Spiegel, 48/1986, 24.11.1986, p. 21 
91 Kristian Kühl (1987), p. 744 
92 Nun Mitleidseffekt zugunsten der SPD? in: Der Spiegel, 48/1986, 24.11.1986, p. 36 
93 Der Rechtsstaat macht sich lächerlich, in: Der Spiegel, 50/1986, 8.12.1986, p. 113 
94 Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuches, der Strafprozeßordnung und des Versammlungsgesetzes und zur 
Einführung einer Kronzeugenregelung bei terroristischen Straftaten vom 9. 6. 1989 (BGBl I, 1059) 
95 Karl Heinz Kunert: Neue Sicherheitsgesetze - mehr Rechtssicherheit? In: Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 
(1989) No. 10, p. 449 
96 Oma im Altkader, in: Der Spiegel, 24/1990, 11.06.1990, p. 86 
97 Tobias Wunschik: Baader-Meinhof international?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2007) No. 40-41, p. 28; 
Helmut Pohl – „Für uns hatte es den Zweck, Fragen zur spreng- und Schießtechnik zu klären“, in: Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 2.7.1991, p. 7; Thomas Riegler (2007), p. 498 
98 Tobias Wunschik: Die Bewegung 2. Juni und ihre Protektion durch den Staatssicherheitsdienst der DDR, in: 
Deutschland Archiv (2007) No. 40, p. 6 
99 Wie die Wasserfälle, in: Der Spiegel, 33/1990, 13.8.1990, p. 56  
 21
 
For the RAF-Aussteiger the leniency law provided a possibility to receive significantly lower 
prison sentences. Susanne Albrecht, who was the first to make a deal with the prosecution, 
admitted her participation in the murder of Jürgen Ponto in 1975 and the failed attack on 
NATO-general Alexander Haig in 1979. She also testified against her former accomplices – 
one of the criteria for the Kronzeugenregelung to apply.100 The testimony of the RAF-
Aussteiger was helpful to clear up some of the older terrorist attacks. However, they had left 
the group a decade earlier, and therefore could not provide any insight into the current 
structures of the group. Der Spiegel analyzed: “The Kronzeugenregelung did indeed make the 
terrorists of before-yesterday talk, but we do not know anything about the RAF of today. The 
aim of the Kronzeugenregelung – preventing future terrorism – has so far failed to 
materialize.”101  
 
In 1991, the trial against Werner Lotze ended in utter failure for the prosecution. Lotze – who 
was charged with murder, attempted murder and bank robbery – was sentenced to 12 years in 
prison, 3 years more than the prosecution had demanded.102 The court dismissed the 
prosecution’s argument that a low sentence would likely motivate active RAF-members to 
surrender, arguing that the court’s task was to put the principle of law into action, and not to 
consider its political implications. After the prosecution’s failure to secure a low sentence for 
Werner Lotze, the Kronzeugenregelung was considered as unsuitable, because – in the words 
of Der Spiegel – it simply “doesn’t pay off” for RAF-terrorists.103 Only two years after it was 
enacted the Kronzeugenregelung was already called “an expiring model.”104  
 
In early 1992, Siegfried Nonne – who claimed that he had participated in the murder of 
Deutsche Bank president Alfred Herrnhausen – was presented as a witness under the 
Kronzeugenregelung by the federal prosecution.105 “The accuracy of his testimony is proven,” 
Der Spiegel quoted the prosecution office.106 But only half a year later Nonne retracted his 
testimony, completely disavowing the leniency law. Nonne claimed that he had been forced 
by police officers to testify against four RAF members, that he had been bribed and 
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threatened with death.107 Later in 1992, the parliament had to vote on renewing the leniency 
law which had been passed with an expiry date. Despite the Nonne scandal, the law was 
extended by the conservative-liberal coalition in late 1992.108 Soon after, the extension of the 
Kronzeugenregelung to the field of organised crime – which had previously been restricted to 
cases of terrorism and drug-related crime –was demanded by parts of the conservative 
CDU/CSU109 as part of its electoral campaign that focused on security issues. The expansion 
of the law was enacted in 1994, the year of the general election.110 
 
Until the late 90’s, the leniency law had not lead to a single conviction of an active RAF 
member. Apart from the RAF Aussteiger-cases, the Kronzeugenregelung had been applied 
only once to a PKK member testifying against other PKK members. In 1999, the newly 
elected red-green government decided not to renew the Kronzeugenregelung, which it 
considered ineffective and “based on denunciation”.111  
 
But the discussion on the leniency law did continue: Less than a year later – and before the 
attacks of 9/11 – the SPD minister of justice, Däubler-Gmelin, proposed the reintroduction of 
the provision, a proposal that was blocked by the Greens.112 In the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, pressure grew to re-enact the provision. A proposal by SPD Interior Minister Otto 
Schily was again blocked by the Greens.113 In the following years, the CDU/CSU, the FDP, 
the federal criminal agency (BKA) and the federal intelligence service (BND) pushed for the 
re-enactment.114 Finally, eight years after its abolition, the CDU/SPD coalition decided to re-
enact the leniency law in 2007. Unlike the old law – which applied only to terrorism and 
organised crime – the new proposal would cover a wide range of crimes, including 
counterfeiting of money, money laundering, child pornography and corruption.115 
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Conclusion 
 
The Kronzeugenregelung was employed in terrorism trials without a legal basis for almost 20 
years beginning in the early 70’s. Right from the beginning, it failed to provide any tangible 
results in the prosecution of terrorist suspects. Instead, the use of crown witnesses by the 
prosecution repeatedly turned into scandals, as happened in the case with Gerhard Müller in 
the Stammheim trials and Siegfried Nonne. Legal experts have unequivocally argued over the 
past 20 years that the law simply failed to deliver.116 No active RAF member has ever been 
convicted because of evidence given by a crown witness. Despite its obvious lack of success, 
the law was repeatedly renewed by the conservative government and reintroduced in 2007 by 
the SPD-CDU/CSU coalition. In public debate, terrorism served as the primary legitimizing 
discourse although the range of application was quickly expanded to other crimes. Debates on 
and reforms of the Kronzeugenregelung visibly followed the electoral cycle.  
 
The Kronzeugenregelung has received more attention than other terrorism-related laws over 
the years. A likely reason for this is that it was originally enacted for a limited time period. 
Arguably, the necessity to renew the law led to more attention by the public and legal experts 
than for laws enacted for an unlimited period of time. 
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Lauschangriff – the wiretapping program 
 
A wiretapping operation is the optical or acoustical surveillance of an individual. The 
surveillance of an individual in a private home (“Großer Lauschangriff”) has always been 
illegal under the German Grundgesetz  The interception of telephone conversations, on the 
other hand, had been routinely practiced since 1945 and legalized under great protests in 
1968.117 The wiretapping program did not become fully legal in Germany until 1998, although 
it had been routinely employed in the decades before.  
 
Wiretapping operations by German authorities first came to the knowledge of the public in the 
so-called “Traube-scandal”. The Traube-scandal became public when a high-ranking 
employee of the Bundesverfassungsschutz passed on the files of an illegal wiretap program to 
Der Spiegel in 1977. 
 
Klaus Traube had been a nuclear expert and manager for Interatom GmbH, part of the atomic 
energy division of Siemens.118 Traube was targeted by the secret service because he was 
friends with leftist lawyer Inge Hornischer. Hornischer had been his divorce lawyer many 
years earlier and had been in contact with the APO movement. Hornischer’s boyfriend was 
Hans-Joachim Klein, who later participated in the attack on the OPEC Conference in Vienna 
in December 1975. When Traube first met Klein in April 1975, however, he had not already 
been involved in terrorist activities.  
 
Because of his acquaintance with Klein, Traube came under police scrutiny. The agency 
suspected that Traube, as the manager for the development of a new generation of nuclear 
plants, had access to technological secrets and to radioactive materials. The 
Bundesverfassungsschutz suspected that Traube might pass on or had already passed on 
information to terrorists. 
 
In January 1976, the Bundesverfassungsschutz broke into Traube’s apartment and installed a 
bugging device.119 Police surveillance of telephone conversations, mail correspondence and of 
an individual outside his or her home had already been legalized in 1968. But it was limited to 
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specific bodies – the Bundesverfassungsschutz not among them – and to a specific legal 
procedure laid down in the so-called G-10-law. The inviolability of the home could, on the 
other hand, only be violated by judicial order in case of danger in delay. Although Traube had 
been subject to a full G-10-surveillance and a full surveillance in his company, no 
incriminating details had been found. Additionally, it quickly became clear from files which 
had been passed on to Der Spiegel that Traube could not possibly pose any danger because of 
new security measures enacted in late 1975 by the nuclear industry restricting access to 
information and nuclear materials. However, after the OPEC attack the Verfassungsschutz 
initiated the illegal wiretapping of Traube’s apartment.  
 
The wiretapping of Traube was, Der Spiegel argued, obviously not an isolated incident. It 
seemed, rather, that the Bundesverfassungsschutz had previously been involved in a number 
of illegal wiretapping operations. The operation against Traube was authorized by the 
president of the Bundesverfassungsschutz Richard Meier, as the documents indicated. The 
Bundesverfassungsschutz and the politically responsible interior ministry had – in the words 
of Der Spiegel editor Rudolf Augstein – violated the constitution in order to protect it.120 
 
Over the course of the Traube-scandal the question was raised if the expanding nuclear 
industry and the risk inherent in the nuclear technology created the necessity to establish a 
radically expanded security machinery and to limit civil liberties.121 The Süddeutsche Zeitung 
commented in late January 1977: “The task of securing huge amounts of poisonous and 
radioactive material against theft, extortion, earthquakes, accidents or war for hundreds or 
thousands of years necessitates an extreme stability of society and an absolute reasonableness 
of humanity in an eternal peace based upon fear.”122 In February 1977, the British energy 
minister, Wedgwood Benn, asked his government and the British industry to investigate 
which civil liberties would need to be restricted if nuclear energy production was to be 
expanded. In 1975, Der Spiegel reported that scientists and officials meeting in Stanford 
discussed how civil liberties could still be protected given the requirements of nuclear 
safety.123  
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Klaus Traube was publicly rehabilitated only weeks after the wiretapping scandal had become 
public.124 Interior minister Maihofer, meanwhile, faced growing criticism as it was suspected 
that the Bundesverfassungsschutz had conducted illegal eavesdropping operations in other 
cases as well.125 Whereas the suspicion against Klaus Traube quickly turned out to be 
baseless, supporters of wiretapping operations took the opportunity to speak out in favour of 
such operations. The CDU parliamentarian, Walter Wallmann, declared that no constitutional 
authorization of wiretapping was necessary, arguing that such a program could be enacted by 
a discretionary decision of the interior minister on an individual basis.126 Some argued that in 
principle unconstitutional eavesdropping could be justified by an “extra-legal state of 
exception” (“übergesetzlicher Notstand”).127 Government and opposition quickly agreed that 
Maihofer, the minister, who claimed not to have known about the operation in advance, 
should remain on in his post.128 A year later, when evidence showed that Maihofer had indeed 
been informed of the operation right from the beginning, he had to step down. 
 
Over the course of the Traube-scandal evidence leaked out that unconstitutional 
eavesdropping had also been conducted in Stuttgart-Stammheim by the CDU-led interior 
ministry during the RAF trials. Prison inmates and their lawyers had been wiretapped in 1975 
and 1976 (“Abhör-Affäre”). At that point, representatives of all parties, ministers of the 
Länder, the interior ministry, the federal prosecution and the intelligence services were 
involved in or informed about the illegal wiretapping programmes.129 Only in 2007 did it 
become known that wiretapping on RAF prison inmates had been much more extensive than 
previously acknowledged.130 A year later in 1978, the military intelligence service 
(Militärischer Abwehrdienst, MAD) stumbled over a number of illegal wiretapping 
operations, most notably on defence minister Georg Leber’s secretary and on a communist 
group in Bavaria.131 Although all three intelligence services were publicly caught with being 
involved in illegal wiretapping, a proposed reform of the services was quickly called off.132 
 
The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) later limited the admissibility of evidence acquired 
through illegal wiretapping in the process against the alleged whistleblowers of the Traube-
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scandal, Karl Dirnhofer and Hans Georg Faust. No evidence acquired directly or as a 
consequence of illegal wiretapping may be admitted before a court.133  
 
After the Traube-scandal, illegal wiretapping was reduced, but not stopped. The 
Verfassungsschutz in Hamburg continued to bug private apartments, though in reduced 
numbers.134 But the majority of wiretapping operations were continued anyway, as they were 
conducted in public space, in public buildings, offices and with the help of directional 
microphones – a practice that was considered not illegal by the intelligence services. In the 
following years illegal wiretapping operations come to the public attention time and again.135 
The illegal use of bugs that became public did not concern terrorist suspects, but, for example, 
the illegal reproduction of books.136 
 
In December 1983 at the latest it became clear that wiretapping without explicit authorization 
by law was illegal when the constitutional court proclaimed the “fundamental right of 
informational self-determination.”137 This right holds that citizens have the right to know who 
is collecting or storing data about them. This was irreconcilable with the intelligence services’ 
practice and even with eavesdropping on individuals by the police without any legal 
authorization. 
 
In 1993 Der Spiegel reported an incident that showed – in the journal’s opinion – that 
successful police and intelligence work would not primarily depend on the right to transgress 
the boundaries of civil liberties and the rule of law, but on careful planning and preparation. 
An Iranian suspect for the killing of four Kurdish-Iranian politicians in Berlin had been 
wiretapped for many months before the attack – but no interpreter was found who could 
understand his conversations.138 
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From the late 80’s till the mid-90’s, organized crime (and especially drug-related crime) 
became the primary security concern of Germany’s security establishment.139 Security 
agencies and politicians demanding an expansion of wiretapping operations increasingly 
referred to organized crime as a justification.140 Advocates of wiretapping argued that only 
eavesdropping programs could break up the mafia leadership.141 Terrorism, on the other hand, 
suddenly played only a negligible role in defending the legalization of wiretapping operations. 
In 1990, the CDU interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble attempted to legalize the wiretapping 
of private homes by the intelligence agencies even without concrete evidence in certain cases, 
for example in cases of drug-related crime.142 Besides, an additional initiative for a law on 
organized crime and drug traffic should have allowed the criminal police to use all elements 
of eavesdropping even on unsuspicious individuals without a judicial order and in private 
homes.143 These initiatives failed because of the resistance of the junior coalition partner FDP 
and of the opposition.144 But only a year later, a similar initiative was launched, this time 
including a change of the Grundgesetz.145 The debate dragged on until after the election 
campaign of 1994, when both the CDU/CSU and the SPD’s candidate Rudolf Scharping 
advocated the expansion of wiretapping competences.146 The campaign’s major issue was 
criminality,147 against which wiretapping – among other measures such as the 
Kronzeugenregelung – was presented as a remedy. The SPD and CDU/CSU were, Der 
Spiegel wrote, trying to outgun each other on who was presenting the tougher measures.148 
However, the coalition-agreement of the re-elected CDU-FDP government did not include 
CDU’s long-standing demand for expanding wiretapping operations as a concession to the 
weakened FDP.149 
 
The Lauschangriff-debate did not, however, wear off. While the public debate continued to 
focus on the specific issue of bugging a private apartment, major expansions of eavesdropping 
                                                 
139 Klaus Weinhauer: „Staat zeigen“. Die polizeiliche Bekämpfung des Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik bis 
Anfang der 1980er Jahre, in: Wolfgang Kraushaar (ed.): Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus, Hamburg 2006, p. 
934 
140 „Zu ängstlich, zu vorsichtig, zu schüchtern“, in: Der Spiegel 13/1988, 28.03.1988, p. 50 
141 Neues Dreieck, in: Der Spiegel 51/1992, 14.12.1992, p. 25 
142 Volkmar Götz: Die Entwicklung des allgemeinen Polizei- und Ordnungsrechts (1990 -1993) Neue Zeitschrift 
für Verwaltungsrecht (1994) No. 7, p. 652; Bonner Streit um Wanzen, in: Der Spiegel 7/1990, 12.02.1990, p. 14 
143 Alles husch, husch, in: Der Spiegel 24/1990, 11.06.1990, p. 32 
144 Die gehen dann spazieren, in: Der Spiegel 21/1992, 18.05.1992, p. 20 
145 Neues Dreieck, in: Der Spiegel 51/1992, 14.12.1992, p. 25 
146 Ulrich Eisenberg: Straf(verfahrens-) rechtliche Maßnahmen gegenüber „Organisiertem Verbrechen", in: Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift (1993) No. 16, p. 1033; Des Kanzlers Haudegen, in: Der Spiegel 28/1993, 12.07.1993, 
p. 26; Taube Ohren, in: Der Spiegel 30/1993, 26.07.1993, p. 26 
147 Bürger als Hilfspolizisten, in: Der Spiegel 25/1993, 21.06.1993, p. 16 
148 Bonner Kriegsrecht, in: Der Spiegel 11/1994, 14.03.1994, p. 32 
149 Zerbrechliches Gebilde, in: Der Spiegel 47/1994, 21.11.1994, p. 18 
 29
competences were enacted without major opposition or public attention.150 Yet another 
process to normalize wiretapping was taking place in the laws of the Bundesländer.151 
Throughout the long-lasting debate on wiretapping on federal level, the Bundesländer allowed 
eavesdropping on private apartments on the grounds of crime prevention 
(Gefahrenabwehr).152 This was the case despite the fact that Art 13 of the Grundgesetz 
stipulated the inviolability of the home for both federal and regional authorities. Parts of the 
wiretapping authorization in the Saxon Polizeigesetz were annulled by the Saxon 
constitutional court in 1996.153 
 
The debate on wiretapping continued to be particularly strong within the FDP. In late 1995, 
party leader Wolfgang Gerhardt and the party’s right wing (most notably Hermann Otto 
Solms, leader of the parliamentary group) conducted a member poll on wiretapping to 
overrule justice minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger’s long-standing opposition and 
the decision of two party conventions.154 Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, one of the last 
representatives of the left-liberal wing in the government, subsequently resigned. The issue of 
wiretapping was an instrument for conducting a political reorientation of the FDP towards 
more right-leaning positions and marginalizing proponents of the left wing.155 This political 
reorientation was also mirrored by a change of the composition of the electorate, with the 
Green party taking over positions traditionally held by the left-liberal wing of the FDP. 
 
In August 1997, the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the SPD agreed on changing the Grundgesetz in 
order to allow wiretapping of private apartments in cases relating to organized crime.156 As it 
became obvious when the decision came to its final phase, the “Großer Lauschangriff” 
legalized only one last element of wiretapping – namely the investigation of crimes already 
committed (Strafverfolgung) by wiretapping of private apartments. Wiretapping of private 
apartments in case of crime prevention (Gefahrenabwehr), on the other hand, had been tacitly 
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legalized through police law reforms (especially of the Bundesländer) in the years before.157 
From a civil liberties perspective, however, the latter constituted a much larger intrusion, as it 
affected the lives of individuals not suspect of having committed a crime.158 Also, it was 
wiretapping for crime prevention – not for prosecution – that had actually provoked the 
Traube scandal and had triggered the debate on wiretapping twenty years earlier. Similarly, 
the competences of the intelligence services had tacitly been extended to include 
eavesdropping on private homes.159 The law was objected to by a major part of legal 
academics who questioned its constitutionality, especially as it allowed the wiretapping of 
non-suspect defence lawyers and could be used against a broad number of minor offenses.160 
 
It is interesting to note, however, that the number of cases where wiretapping of homes was 
employed was relatively small. In the period between 1990/1991 (when the Ländergesetze 
were enacted) and 1996, the measure was used 106 times – 67 of them alone in Bayern.161 It 
was argued that the reason for this very limited number might have been that police 
authorities were insecure about the constitutionality of the measure and therefore used it only 
in exceptional cases. Others argued that the measure itself was of only very limited use: 
professional criminals could easily handle the risk of being wiretapped. 
 
In a curious twist, the new interior minister Otto Schily actually defended the “Großer 
Lauschangriff” with the argument that existing competences in crime prevention were already 
much more intrusive than the current proposal.162 Oskar Lafontaine, a leading figure in the 
SPD, defended his party’s approval of the measure by arguing that “the current practice of 
wiretapping needs to have a proper constitutional basis.”163 Again, this was a curious twist as 
measures without a constitutional basis are illegal. Here, on the other hand, the (illegal) 
practice gave legitimization to a constitutional reform. 
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The experience with the fully legalized wiretapping did not lead to the promised successes, as 
the parliamentary reports on wiretapping showed year after year.164 Especially gang leaders – 
who could supposedly only be caught with the help of wiretapping of private homes – could 
not be successfully targeted. But this had not been the main goal of the proposal’s advocates 
in any case, as Rudolf Augstein and Marion Gräfin Dönhoff – editors of Der Spiegel and Die 
Zeit, respectively – argued in an article. The CDU had primarily used the topic to split and 
discredit the opposition.165 
 
In March 2004 the federal constitutional court delivered a staunching rebuke of the 
Lauschangriff.166 The proceedings had been initiated by three representatives of the FDP’s left 
wing, ex-ministers of the interior Gerhard Baum and of Justice Sabine Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger and ex-vice-president of the Bundestag, Burkhard Hirsch. The law, Der 
Spiegel wrote, would be annulled in large parts and should be repaired within a very short 
period of 16 months. In reality, the ruling was much more ambivalent.167 Most notably, the 
reform of Art 13 Grundgesetz limiting the inviolability of the home was considered 
constitutional. Wiretapping of private homes for reasons of prosecution does not per se violate 
human dignity. While the court had to overturn the whole law, the court’s real critique 
concerned only specific issues, such as the lack of rules on the prohibition of the use of 
certain evidence. The court’s decision also necessitated a limitation of offenses that justified 
the use of wiretapping. Only crimes with a range of punishment of over five years 
imprisonment should justify wiretapping of private homes. It is important to specify that the 
ruling concerned only the investigation (Strafverfolgung), but left police competences in 
danger prevention (Gefahrenabwehr) completely intact.168 An adapted law was enacted by the 
SPD/Green government later in 2004.169 
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While the constitutional court’s decision did really mark a roll-back to measures intrusive to 
civil liberties to some extent,170 far more intrusive measures had been previously enacted in 
the field of danger prevention – an area not covered by the constitutional court’s decision.171 
At least five Bundesländer had created laws allowing their intelligence services to wiretap 
unsuspicious third persons before and after 9/11.172  
 
In December 2008, the CDU-SPD coalition passed a new BKA law. It assigned the BKA the 
competence to wiretap private homes.173 In particular, the BKA was given the competence for 
the “preventive fight against crime.” This competence already applies when there is no 
concrete danger (Gefahrenabwehr) – in principle this is a competence of intelligence 
services.174 
 
Shortly before, the constitutional court had passed a decision on online-searching (“Online-
Durchsuchung”) of private computers.175 It slammed a law that would have provided the 
competence for the police to secretly enter private computers and observe all actions and 
communications pursued. The provision would have been a functional equivalent to the 
wiretapping of private homes. The court decided, however, that the online-searching violated 
the privacy rights of individuals. 
Conclusion 
 
The phase between 1977, the year when the Traube scandal first brought illegal wiretapping 
operations to public attention, and 1998, the year when the constitutional change was passed 
finally authorizing the bugging of private apartments, can be described as a creeping 
normalization process. In the 70’s, there was a general agreement among most politicians, 
practitioners and academics that eavesdropping on private homes was unconstitutional except 
in cases of a general threat to the general security. However, illegal wiretapping was routinely 
performed by the police and the intelligence services.  
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A creeping normalization took place when the legal preconditions for wiretapping were 
increasingly watered down in the police laws of the Bundesländer and the laws on the 
intelligence services in the 80’s and early 90’s. Wiretapping could only be employed if 
justified by overriding reasons of danger prevention (Gefahrenabwehr). In 1977 there was a 
common agreement among lawyers and politicians that – in principle – an intrusion into the 
inviolability of the home could only be justified by the immediate necessity to protect the life 
of an individual (the core meaning of the concept of Gefahrenabwehr). Over the next twenty 
years, a creeping expansion of the legal concept of danger prevention occurred, so that in the 
90’s wiretapping operations could be justified by almost any kind of crime and the slightest 
suspicion.176 The reforms of 1998 in reality legalized only a tiny area that had remained 
unregulated, whereas in general wiretapping had been gradually legalized in the years before. 
At the end of this process, the constitutional changes of the Grundgesetz did in fact not limit 
civil liberties but guaranteed at least fractions of the inviolability of the home by erecting a 
constitutional limit to yet another expansion of wiretapping. 
 
The general discussion on the right of the state to eavesdrop on its citizens was both defined 
and limited by the concept of the “Großer Lauschangriff.” The discussion was limited by this 
concept because major areas of the application of wiretapping – wiretapping justified by 
reasons of danger prevention, wiretapping outside of the home and wiretapping legalized by 
the Bundesländer – were never subject to public debate over the course of twenty years and 
were either legal from the beginning or quietly legalized.  
 
Advocates of wiretapping used completely different topoi to justify its employment and 
legalization over the course of twenty years. In the late 70’s, it was terrorism. This changed 
completely in the late 80’s and the 90’s, when drugs and organized crime became the 
dominating figure of justification. After 9/11, the focus again reverted back to terrorism. 
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Rasterfahndung 
 
Computers have been employed by the police for criminal investigations since the early 
60’s.177 Bayern was the first region to employ computers for police work. From the late 60’s 
on computers were used by all major police branches.178 The term Rasterfahndung in its core 
meaning describes a system where the data of unsuspicious citizens – acquired from non-
police databases – is filtered according to specific criteria: a specific combination of different 
characteristics that are unsuspicious in themselves might lead to criminals. From the early 
70’s on, computers located in different cities or agencies could electronically exchange 
information.179 The first major attempts to centralize criminal data occurred in 1970, when a 
computerized central register of criminal records was realized.180  
 
The history of computerized criminal investigation parallels the growth of the federal criminal 
agency (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA).181 Originally, police competences were generally held by 
the Bundesländer, while the BKA had only competences to collect information and data and 
pass them down to the regional police agencies.182 The BKA had no executive competences 
and needed a formal request by one of the regional police agencies to initiate any kind of 
activity. The BKA grew drastically in competences and personnel over the course of the 70’s. 
Horst Herold, who became BKA president in 1971 and who was responsible for both the 
expansion of computerized investigation and of the BKA in general,183 was one of the most 
prominent media figures in the 70’s with regard to security issues.  
 
The BKA-law was changed in 1973: the agency acquired numerous competences, including 
the primary responsibility for international crime, organized crime, drug-related crime and 
arms trade. Most importantly, the BKA could now be directly instructed by the federal 
prosecution office to start investigations, making the agency much more independent from the 
regional police agencies. The number of employees of the agency rose from 818 in 1965 to 
3339 in 1980;184 the agency’s budget rose from 22 million mark in 1969 to 75 million in 
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1972.185 Two main developments made this centralization of police competences186 against 
the interest of the Bundesländer possible. First, the perceived threat by the RAF provided a 
window of opportunity to extend federal competences. Initially, this happened without a legal 
basis: the BKA gained only factual primacy in the fight against the RAF.187 Later, these 
competences were formally established by the BKA law. Second, the BKA was established by 
Horst Herold as the primary focal point for data collection.188 The centralization of 
competences was justified by arguments of efficiency.189 However, the centralization process 
was also used to establish completely new competences not previously held by the regional 
police authorities. Electronic databases, being one of the most important innovations of 
criminal investigation in the past decades, seemed to be one of the major instruments for 
centralizing police competences on a federal level in Germany. Again after 9/11, the BKA’s 
competences were greatly expanded in the fight against terrorism. First, investigations on 
international terrorism came under the sole authority of the agency. Second, the BKA finally 
received crime prevention competences (Gefahrenabwehr); previously, the BKA could only 
act under criminal investigation competences (Strafverfolgung). So, the BKA finally became a 
“genuine police authority.”190 However, the growth of the BKA is part of a general expansion 
of police forces. The police forces of the Bundesländer grew by 43% between 1970 and 1980, 
the Verfassungsschutz by 64%. The BKA, meanwhile, grew by 176%.191 
 
The introduction of computerized administration of data caused fear about privacy rights and 
about the state spying on its citizens. In Hessen, which was the first Bundesland to introduce 
comprehensive databases, the first data protection supervisor was also appointed.192 In 1973, a 
federal law on the registration of persons (Meldegesetz) was proposed, aimed at establishing 
individual numbers for every citizen that should allow the full interaction of public and 
private electronic databases.193 It was rejected by the legal committee of the parliament which 
doubted its constitutionality. Nevertheless, a functional equivalent of the personal number was 
established a few years later.194 At the same time, a federal law on data protection was 
enacted. These law proposals sparked the first major debate in Germany on the issue of data 
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collection and data protection. Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) summarized 
the opposing opinions in Der Spiegel: “Growing computerization might theoretically also 
include the danger that our social state degenerates to a termite state. But the law on data 
protection will make sure that heavy damage will not occur.”195 Critics invoked Aldous 
Huxley’s novel “1984”, arguing that the state would become a “big brother.” Especially the 
possibility of combining information from different databases caused major criticism.196  
 
Some critics argued that the major problem of massive data collection and cross linking is not 
simply the possibility of abuse, about which under normal circumstances the victims would 
never know and therefore could not intervene, but rather the fact that a great amount of 
information about all citizens being accessible electronically is totalitarian itself, even though 
politicians and civil servants might not intend abuse.197 In the late 60’s and early 70’s, most 
public institutions started to employ digital databases. At the same time, the intelligence 
services built their own database, “Nadis”, that already held more than 2 million entries in 
1973.198 
 
Around 1976, a large number of data abuses of private and public institutions became public. 
Most notably, the Verfassungsschutz databases were used for investigations on individuals 
required under the Radikalenerlass. The law on data protection as proposed in 1976 was 
widely criticised as a rather toothless instrument. In particular, a broad range of databases was 
excluded completely from control by courts or a data protection supervisor, including the 
databases of the intelligence services such as the Verfassungsschutz and the MAD, of the 
BKA, the police, the prosecution and the tax authorities.199 Additionally, “internal data” of 
private companies or public institutions not intended for external use should be equally 
excluded from the data protection law. In an interview, a renowned data protection specialist, 
Spiros Simitis, concluded that the law was the result of opposing interests. A stricter law 
would have had no chance against the growing interests in data collection.200 However, it was 
argued by a broad majority of the academic community that these exemptions make the law 
worthless in practical terms.201 Wilhelm Steinmüller, who had been a consultant to the 
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government on data protection issues some years earlier, called the law “a worn-down beauty 
who has only a few teeth left.”202 – “Within this immense secret area, almost all kinds of data 
collection and data exchange are allowed and are not controlled by the citizen, the data 
protection authorities, the parliament or the judges.” 
 
Meanwhile, six Bundesländer (Bremen, Berlin, Bayern, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein 
and Saarland) enacted laws that obliged all public institutions to inform the Verfassungsschutz 
if they receive suspicious information on citizens. These concerned information that indicated 
terrorist activities or spying, but also “activities aimed against the free democratic order.”203 
This blanket clause had – as will be shown in the chapter on the Radikalenerlass – a rather 
broad scope, potentially catching all kinds of left activism and opinions. In some regions these 
laws caused a “popular uprising”, as the daily Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote, in schools, 
universities and city administrations, all of which were potentially obliged to inform the 
intelligence services about many forms of activism.204 
 
From the mid 70’s on, the BKA started to practice what has since then come to be known as 
“Rasterfahndung”: the search for yet unknown suspects in non-police databases. However, the 
practice of comparing the entries of police and non-databases goes back to the mid-60’s.205 
 
The earliest database was “Nadis”, established by the intelligence services in 1968 without a 
legal foundation.206 The list of “lawful” data sources for Nadis included courts, prosecutors, 
prisons, the police, the car registry, electoral agencies, the public archives, libraries, passport 
and alien registration offices, the foreign ministry in regard to aliens, social insurances, labour 
unions, employer associations, chambers of commerce, doctors’ and lawyers’ associations, 
neighbours, friends and landlords.207 
 
Another database, “Pios”, was employed against the RAF. Pios was less focused on the 
collection of criminal information (carried out by its big sister network “Inpol”, the police 
database), but rather on non-criminal information such as hints from the population, addresses 
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from notebooks of terror suspects and speculations of the police on sympathizers.208 Pios was 
involved, BKA president Herold claimed, in the arrest of numerous RAF terrorists, such as 
Knut Folkerts, Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Peter Jürgen Boock. As the principle of the Pios 
database depended on the collection of seemingly unsuspicious information, the police 
collected information in large numbers. In Berlin, Der Spiegel reported that police were 
entering all visitors to the anarchist trials into the database. The police were particularly keen 
on collecting data and fingerprints from what they suspected to be the scene of RAF 
sympathizers: residents of communes, people handing out leaflets against nuclear plants, 
participants of violent demonstrations, youth members of the labour unions, and gays and 
transsexuals. 
 
The earliest Rasterfahndungen in the mid-60’s compared electronic police search lists with an 
electronic register of residents.209 In the following years, more and more databases were 
digitalized, allowing more complex searches. Among the databases regularly included in 
BKA searches were vehicle registration registers and the registers of pension insurances. 
Additionally, it was reported in 1979 that the police had over time tried to acquire all kinds of 
databases for searches, such as library lists, registers of health insurances and of private 
companies.  
 
Successes attributed to the Rasterfahndung included the uncovering of more than 80 DDR 
spies.210 During the investigations following the Schleyer-kidnapping in 1977 the 
Rasterfahndung was employed for the first time on a major scale. Some years later, the then 
ex-BKA president, Herold, described its use in an interview with Der Spiegel: “In 1979 the 
RAF apparently had one or more apartment hide-outs in Frankfurt, rented under a false name. 
It was clear that the terrorists could not pay the electricity bill by bank transfer. Thus it was 
clear that we would find the false names among the group of people paying the electricity bill 
in cash. The number of individuals in this group was 18.000. How could we find the false 
names used by the terrorists in such a group? The answer is easy: we deleted all legal names, 
and only the false names could be left over: we acquired the names of all cash-payers on a 
magnetic tape by judicial order, and deleted all names of legal persons: registered inhabitants, 
registered car-owners, retirees, recipients of student benefits, people with entries in the land 
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register, those owning a fire insurance, persons with health insurances and so on. In the 
Frankfurt case we found two false names: one of a drug dealer and one being the wanted 
terrorist Heißler, who was arrested in his apartment hide-out shortly after. Rasterfahndung 
relies on negative criteria that the perpetrator cannot fulfil. If the perpetrator uses a false 
name, he cannot be registered, cannot be a car-owner, cannot draw student benefits and so 
on.”211 
 
Rasterfahndung was also employed during the hijacking of the airplane Landshut in 1979. 
70.000 hotel registration forms from Mallorca – the airport of origin of the Landshut – were 
matched with the Pios-database, and three of the four hijackers could be identified.212 In 1980, 
another attempt in Hamburg and other cities to employ the Rasterfahndung led to a major 
scandal. The police tried to seize the magnetic band holding the names of individuals paying 
their electricity bill in cash just like they did in the Frankfurt case. However, the seizure 
became public before the data match could be carried through. Heavy public protests forced 
the police to cancel the action.213 The main criticism concerned the fact that thousands of 
innocent people were potentially suspected of terrorism and harmed by the police 
investigations. The Rasterfahndung turned the presumption of innocence upside down: 
whenever individuals fulfilled specific neutral criteria, they were obliged to prove that they 
were not criminals. An insurance employee was arrested for three weeks in 1977, lost his job 
and was subsequently observed for another two years for the simple and only reason that he 
had been a DDR emigrant and was occasionally flying to Berlin.214 He was later cleared of all 
charges. Federal data protection officer Hans Peter Bull demanded at a conference of criminal 
police officers in 1979: “It is necessary to strictly comply with the rule of law, in order not to 
give the impression of a surveillance state.”215 The police was working without any proper 
legal basis but on the general principle of administrative assistance (Amtshilfe), holding that 
public institutions had to assist each other. 
 
Terrorism had been the main argument for the development of the Rasterfahndung, and 
proponents of the measure continued to defend it for its allegedly important role in the fight 
against the RAF – despite the fact that it led to only a single investigative success.216 
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Additionally, proponents of the measure tried to present the Rasterfahndung as a completely 
normal form of investigation. During the years of his presidency, the BKA-president, Horst 
Herold, continually gave the following story to play down the issue: “if we know that the 
murderer is a baker, we will need to check every baker in this country.”217  
 
Horst Herold was pushed out of office in 1981 by the liberal interior minister Baum. Der 
Spiegel commented: “Over many years Rasterfahndung – unscrupulously employed by the 
BKA-president, Herold, – was a controversial issue in this country. As it became finally 
known that thousands of completely innocent citizens had been caught in his suspicion trap 
and that the over bred investigation apparatus was slipping from political control, Herold was 
stopped and pushed out of office.”218 The conservative-liberal successor government did not, 
however, intend to limit the development and expansion of the electronic investigation 
technique. Rather, the new government’s interest was to limit restrictions on data use by the 
police, as was manifested in the CSU interior minister Zimmermann’s fight against the federal 
data protection supervisor, Hans Peter Bull. Zimmermann’s attacks on Bull were in part 
motivated by the fact that Bull had been a SPD appointee and was a SPD member. But the 
conflict also concerned the question of what forms of police use of data should be supervised. 
The CSU state secretary, Spranger, accused Bull of “misunderstanding his task when he acts 
as the superior controller of all state action.”219 Resistance to the data protection supervisor 
came not only from conservative politicians, but also from the public administration itself. A 
number of agencies complained that the control by Bull’s office would impede their work, 
despite the fact that Bull’s office had a total of 30 employees to control 300,000 federal 
employees (not counting the employees of the postal service, railways and the army, which – 
as federal public agencies – were likewise under the supervision of the federal data protection 
supervisor).220 After the change in government, some agencies such as the Verfassungsschutz 
curtailed the right of inspection of the federal data protection supervisor.221 
 
The reform of the social law in 1981 brought an explicit and remarkably restrictive regulation 
of data transmission to the police and the intelligence services, which had not been regulated 
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and thus had not been forbidden before.222 Data transmission to the intelligence services and 
to the BKA was explicitly restricted to individual cases, thus aimed at rendering a 
Rasterfahndung of social data impossible, as the lawmaker argued in the materials.223 This 
limitation did not apply, however, when the Rasterfahndung was ordered by a judge.224 
 
It seems that the general perception of the development in the field of computerized police 
investigation in the 70’s and especially in the 80’s was that a major change in the structure of 
the rule of law was in the making.225 This became particularly obvious in 1983 and 1984, 
when newspapers analyzed the development of police surveillance and the rule of law on the 
occasion of Huxley’s novel “1984”. Der Spiegel summarized this perceived change as 
follows: “Today, Rasterfahndung is a common instrument of investigation. It has extended 
the sphere of police action to unsuspicious people and to merely abstract threats. Security 
agencies tend to define their competences in the field of danger prevention much more 
broadly than before. They develop an idea of security that is not restricted to the protection of 
the legal order, but includes the social order as well. Stuttgart police president Stümper argues 
that ‘security comprises different inter-relations, everything is connected: inner security, 
international security, psychological security, social security, economic and energy safety.’ 
The interest of the police in crime prevention has been transformed into ‘an interest in social 
control’, as legal scholar Eckart Riehle argues. ‘Security problems are not defined in relation 
to the legal order, but in relation to disturbances in the social practice.’”226  
 
Being a criminal investigation tool, Rasterfahndung was also conceived as an instrument of a 
social-technical utopia. In interviews, Herold spoke about the possibility of completely 
erasing criminality by identifying “causes” of criminality: “The long-term goal is to fight 
socially damaging behaviour systematically, not only selectively. […] The available massive 
amount of data about motives, milieu, the influence of alcohol, drugs, and the relation 
between city structure, living conditions and criminality help to find rational insights into the 
characteristics of criminality, and to find objective rules with regard to the development of 
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criminality, its causes and the existence of structural defects of society.”227 – In later years, 
Herold also recognized the dystopian elements of his fantasy: “The boundlessness of 
information processing would allow the individual to be accompanied for his whole life, and 
to make snapshots and profiles of his personality, in all areas, forms and expressions of life: to 
observe, control and register, and to have the data present at all times without the grace of 
forgetting. ‘Big brother’ isn’t just literature any longer. Given the current state of technology, 
it is real.”228 Critics argued that the possibility of full control would lead to a pressure to 
conform229 and would ultimately lead to a surveillance state.230 From the police perspective, 
however, a positive view on the social function of data collection definitely persisted until the 
80’s.231 
 
The late 70’s brought growing criticism of the extension of security competences and of the 
growth of the police by an “audience that has grown suspicious” (data protection officer 
Bull).232 The interior minister, Baum, reduced competences of the BKA and finally dismissed 
Horst Herold. The magazine Stern published a cover story called “SOS – Freedom in 
Germany” in August 1978, and Der Spiegel launched an extensive series on the practices and 
risks of data collection and wiretapping (“Das Stahlnetz stülpt sich über uns”). This growing 
criticism and the fear of a state excessively controlling its citizens gave impetus to a growing 
data protection movement. Weinhauer argues that the emergence of new social movements 
after 1977 and in the 80’s (the creation of the green party in 1980, the establishment of the left 
newspaper TAZ in 1979, the anti-nuclear movement, the protests against the expansion of the 
Frankfurt airport, etc.) should be seen as a reaction to what was perceived as an excessive 
expansion of police and surveillance competences.233 
 
Social and political criticism of the seemingly limitless use of data by state authorities found a 
target in the census of 1983.234 Although the 1983 census did not fundamentally differ from 
the census held in 1970, it nevertheless drew major criticism and provoked 500 constitutional 
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complaints.235 There had been, Spiros Simitis argued, a change of consciousness on the 
handling of personal data. The fact that comprehensive statistical information was not 
anonymous but could be electronically attributed to individuals was particularly criticised. 
Critics of the census attempted to organize a boycott.236 
 
The growing protests against the census also sparked another major debate. For years, it was 
planned to introduce computer-readable ID-cards. The project had been initiated by the left-
liberal coalition and continued by the CDU-FDP coalition. The law on ID cards had been 
passed unanimously and without debate in parliament. When major critique was voiced 
against the census and against its inherent control and surveillance function, public attention 
also turned to the ID-card project, which had been largely ignored before. Der Spiegel 
published a piece on the ID-card project titled “Admission ticket to the surveillance state” in 
1983.237 The president of Hamburg’s Verfassungsschutz, the CDU politician Christian Lochte, 
said that “the federal government infringes upon the principle of proportionality when it 
imposes a new ID-card system on 30 million citizens while looking for 30 terrorists.”238 The 
idea of the ID-card had first been brought up in 1977 by the then BKA-president Herold, who 
had demanded forgery-proof ID-cards in reaction to the RAF’s use of forged or stolen IDs. It 
was criticised, however, that especially a well-equipped and highly conspiratorial terrorist 
group such as the RAF could easily avoid being caught by the new system. Although it was 
clear that the new system would have little effect on terrorists, the CDU/CSU continued to use 
the argument against the opponents of the project. The CSU accused adversaries of the system 
of wanting the “destruction of freedom and the rule of law.”239 It was reported that the interior 
ministers’ conference had instructed the police already in 1977 by a secret order to 
electronically check all individuals that the police had contact with – victims, witnesses, 
suspects – “in a way that the concerned person does not notice the control.”240 
 
Anti-terrorism ceased to be, however, the main argument of the security agencies in the 
defence of the ID-cards in the early 80’s. The main interest became the possibility to radically 
expand secret surveillance (the program was called “beobachtende Fahndung”, later 
“polizeiliche Beobachtung”): observing individuals not suspicious of a specific crime and 
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being able to track their movements with the help of regular ID-controls.241 In fact, the 
“polizeiliche Beobachtung” mainly concerned individuals related to drug-crime and a huge 
group of left and autonomous groups. While the number of terrorism sympathizers was not 
growing according to all accounts, the number of individuals registered under the polizeiliche 
Beobachtung was. In 1983, 11,000 individuals were registered, often individuals who were 
merely friends of other registered people or had travelled in the same train compartment to 
West Berlin.242 Thus, the main intention was to expand the possibility of identity checks, for 
example at demonstrations.243  
 
In December 1983, the constitutional court ruled on the complaints in regard to the census 
law.244 The court’s decision was and still is perceived as the single most important legal act in 
regard to data protection and had tremendous impact on the development of data-protection 
worldwide. The court developed the constitutional “right of informational self-determination” 
and ruled that the census law was unconstitutional. The court stated that “a societal and legal 
order is not consistent with the right of informational self-determination if citizens cannot 
know any longer who knows what about them. If somebody is unsure whether divergent 
behaviour is registered for all times, used or passed on, he will try not to stand out with such 
behaviour. […] This would not only limit personal development, but also the common good, 
as self-determination is a fundamental precondition of a free and democratic community. 
From this it follows that the personal development under conditions of modern data handling 
presupposes the protection of the individual against unlimited data collection, use and 
dissemination of personal data. This protection is covered by the Grundgesetz […]. This 
fundamental right holds the right of the individual to decide on the disclosure and use of his 
personal data.”  
 
The weeks and months after the court’s decision were characterized by a major battle on the 
interpretation of the verdict.245 Friedrich Zimmermann’s interior ministry called the decision 
“a piece from the madhouse.”246 Some weeks later it published a statement arguing that the 
decision had to be interpreted restrictively: “A maximalist interpretation of the verdict would 
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lead to a standstill of major parts of the public administration.”247 The conservative newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung argued that “the court has been taken advantage of.”248 In 
contrast, outspoken critics of the law, such as the law professors Erhard Denninger and Spiros 
Simitis, attempted to consolidate a broad interpretation of the decision.249 Denninger argued 
in a report that the verdict held that every collection and use of data had to be based on an 
explicit legal authorization. Moreover, the principle established by the court would not only 
cover the census law itself, but all fields of public administration, including the police. This 
interpretation of the verdict was especially targeted at the police practice of collecting and 
using all sorts of data (including that of non-police authorities) for the Rasterfahndung that 
had been practiced until then without any legal authorization.  
 
The constitutional court’s decision contained a specific passage prohibiting the passing on of 
data by the simple way of administrative assistance (Amtshilfe), and abolishing the practice 
used for the Rasterfahndung of routinely acquiring non-police data, e.g. from social 
insurances, a practice that had been taken for granted by the police for decades. This 
development shows that developments in the rule of law are not simply a matter of “more or 
less rights.” The court was not simply taking away police competences that they had 
illegitimately acquired in the years before with the help of a new technology. Rather, the 
police practice of simply acquiring and storing all information without an explicit legal basis 
with the help of computers was a continuation of a much older practice: that the state 
structures had routinely been based on the assumption that the citizen was a subordinate to the 
state and had no right to interfere with the actions of state agencies who are working together 
as a “general authority.” From this perspective, the court’s decision was not simply a going 
back to the old situation. Nor was it simply an adaptation of the “classic” civil liberties to a 
new technology. But rather, the court curtailed the century old tradition of the authoritarian 
state. Similarly, the Radikalenerlass – the state having full authority to dispose of its 
“subordinate” public servants in all aspects – could be seen as reminiscent of a pre-
democratic, authoritarian idea of the state that was revived in the 70’s.250 
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Underneath the conflict on data protection – being tough on crime, on the one hand, the luring 
danger of the surveillance state, on the other hand, – a structural conflict between different 
institutions was also observable. The court emphasised the importance of independent control 
of public administration: “The participation of independent data protection supervisors is of 
significant importance for an effective protection of the right to informational self-
determination, as the use and storage of data under the conditions of automatic data handling 
remain untransparent for the citizens.”251 The role of data protection commissioners had been 
an issue of constant conflict since their establishment in the 70’s, the different public agencies 
opposing external control of their activities. The principle that data collection must be 
explicitly and individually authorized by law only became more and more accepted over the 
years following the court’s verdict.252 Two parallel developments took place: there was the 
conflict between state agencies which aimed at extending their surveillance competences, on 
the one side, and data protection supervisors, on the other side. But there also was a legal 
conflict between the argument that a general danger-prevention competence was sufficient to 
legitimize Rasterfahndung, on the one hand, and the argument that explicit and individual 
authorization by law was necessary, on the other.  
 
Another example why it seems necessary to see the census-verdict not only in its data 
protection dimension but also as a reduction of the authoritarian state is the Kießling-Wörner-
affair. Günter Kießling had been a German four-star general working in the NATO 
headquarters.253 The military intelligence service MAD had acquired information on 
Kießling’s alleged homosexuality. The defence minister, Günter Wörner, forced him into 
early retirement in late 1983, as the general was perceived as being vulnerable to 
blackmailing. The research by MAD turned out to be based on absurd evidence,254 Kießling 
was rehabilitated soon after.255 In particular, one detail caught the attention of the critical 
public: MAD had instructed the police in Köln to investigate Kießling in the gay scene.256 
Although this was illegal, this kind of cooperation between the police and the army 
intelligence service had been common practice for decades. The intelligence services had no 
executive competences (such as conducting criminal investigations) and were restricted to the 
gathering of information. In the Kießling affair, however, the police gave administrative 
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assistance to MAD in a field where the intelligence service itself had no competences. 
However, the (theoretical) separation of police and executive functions, on the one hand, and 
intelligence functions, on the other, is provided for by the Grundgesetz. After the experience 
of the Nazi secret police, Gestapo, that held both these functions, the separation of these two 
functions in separate organizations was seen as a prerequisite for a democratic, non-
totalitarian society after World War II. The routine cooperation of the intelligence service and 
the police obviously ran counter to this separation principle and strengthened the image of all 
state agencies serving the same authoritarian state interest (The guidelines for cooperation of 
intelligence services and the police enacted in 1970 were kept secret). The Kießling affair was 
the catalyst for critics to question the legal position of the military intelligence services and 
their competences on a fundamental level. Neither the MAD nor the other military 
intelligence services, the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst), were operating on a proper legal 
basis. They had been established simply by a governmental decree in the 50’s and had 
operated on this basis ever since.257 In the wake of the Kießling affair, this legal basis was 
finally perceived as shady and insufficient after remaining rather uncontested in the previous 
30 years. On the occasion of the Kießling affair the parliament set up an inquiry committee. 
The functionality of the other intelligence services was questioned as well.258 An inquiry by 
Der Spiegel into the BND gave a picture of a dysfunctional agency that had successfully been 
blocking attempts of parliamentary or executive control over the years. The BND’s political 
self-conception and its work style were shaped by its first president, Reinhard Gehlen. Gehlen 
had been the head of spying activity in Eastern Europe for the Wehrmacht in World War II. 
After the war, he built up the BND using the same strategies and the same personnel that he 
had worked with during the war. In its inquiry into the BND, Der Spiegel suggested that the 
BND in the 80’s continued to be shaped by Gehlen’s tradition, inspired by World War II. 
 
The census law and the Kießling affair seem to be similar to the extent that both deal with a 
situation where state agencies wanted unlimited access to the data of citizens without much 
consideration  for what they were legally allowed or prohibited to do. From this perspective, 
both cases seem to deal with state agencies trying to use an authoritarian, unlimited 
competence. The court’s decision and the public reaction to the Kießling-affair, however, 
seem to indicate a movement towards a system where state agencies are accountable to the 
citizens and are only allowed to act on an explicit legal basis. 
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The Kießling affair was only one of a greater number of scandals that struck the Kohl-
government in the years after 1983. The minister for economic affairs, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, 
was involved in a bribery and money laundering scandal, and the subsequent attempt of the 
government to pass an amnesty law for the politicians and businessmen involved led to Hans-
Dietrich Genscher resigning from his post as the FDP president. In the ensuing months, the 
Kießling affair was perceived as being primarily concerned with the mischievous spread of 
wrong information about a general, and the legal aspects of the affair got pushed aside, 
especially the shady cooperation between the police and the MAD. In 1984, a minor reform of 
the agency was carried out,259 but only in 1990 a law was passed that finally created a proper 
legal basis for the agency. 
 
The constitutional court’s census decision, on the other hand, had an astounding impact.260 In 
the short run, data protection laws and measures had to be significantly overhauled against the 
explicit will of the interior minister, Zimmermann.261 In the years following the constitutional 
court’s decision two trends are identifiable. On the one hand, the decision boosted attempts to 
improve and strengthen data protection legislation. On the other hand, attempts can be 
identified which aim at limiting the decision’s material impact as much as possible so as to 
only follow the formal requirements defined by the court. This was especially obvious in the 
reform of the intelligence services as developed by the CDU and CSU in 1985.262 The reform 
should cover a new MAD-law, the law on the Verfassungsschutz and a law on the cooperation 
of police and the intelligence services. The interior ministry argued that impediments to the 
citizens’ rights to informational self-determination (and thus all kinds of collection and use of 
data by the authorities) were allowed provided that the measures were based on laws. The 
proposed laws were – generally speaking – turning the principle developed by the 
constitutional court upside down. The court had proposed a system where data collection and 
use was forbidden unless explicitly permitted by law. The proposals by CDU/CSU, in 
contrast, allowed all data collection and use unless explicitly excluded. Moreover, the police 
authorities and the prosecution were obliged to pass on all personal information that was 
deemed relevant for the work of the Verfassungsschutz.263 Critics argued that the proposed 
laws were not adapting the continuing (obviously illegal) police practice – among them the 
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Rasterfahndung – to the principles developed by the constitutional court, but were rather 
codifying the illegal practice.264 The other potentially more important principles developed in 
the census decision – the proportionality principle that should limit the flood of data and the 
principle of limited use of data that should restrict the passing on of data to other institutions – 
were largely ignored in the law proposals. As soon as data were entered into a police 
database, it could be subject to Rasterfahndung at will. 
 
The growing technical possibilities seemed to lead to an increasing collection and use of data. 
The Inpol-System, as the centralized police database, registered 1.5 million queries per month 
in 1986, twenty times the number of queries that had been made via telephone or mail before 
the computer system was installed in 1972.265 The terrorism database Pios was enlarged from 
300 entries in the early 70’s to 11000 in the 80’s.  
 
Growing protests from the coalition partner FDP,266 the association of judges, the labour 
union of policemen and by lawyers led to the adoption of only two of the seven proposed 
laws: the law on the computer-readable ID-cards and the so-called “Schleppnetzfahndung”.267 
The latter instrument268 allowed identity control and registration of persons within a specific 
regional area in case of a crime. Data collected with the help of ID controls was to be 
screened according to different “suspicious” criteria.269 The concept of the 
“Schleppnetzfahndung” had been proposed and largely criticised by practitioners back in 
1977 during the peak of RAF terrorism. Building up control posts around a crime site would 
be, the criticism went, much too slow to catch the real perpetrators.270 The real use of the 
provision – especially in the mid-80’s, when the issue of violent demonstrations by 
environmental activists was a hot topic – seemed to be to allow the police to build up broad 
control circles around demonstrations. While previously control posts had been erected only 
in cases of terrorism or of particularly dangerous crimes, the new law allowed ID-controls 
everywhere and the unlimited storage of the collected data.271  
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The murder of Gerold von Braunmühl, a high-ranking official in the foreign ministry, by the 
RAF in October 1986 sparked new attempts to push through the proposed security laws. The 
interior minister, Zimmermann, himself under major criticism, accused the coalition partner, 
the FDP, of having obstructed the security package and thus being partly responsible for the 
murder.272 Excessive data protection laws, Zimmermann argued, had protected terrorists and 
their sympathizers. At the same time Zimmermann acknowledged that the available 
instruments – such as the Rasterfahndung – had not been successful in the terrorist hunt. The 
government pushed for a law eliminating all (possible) limits of the Rasterfahndung and for 
the so-called Zevis-law, which would allow police access to the central car registration 
database.273  
 
Initially, the security law package was not primarily marketed as an anti-terrorism measure. 
But with another RAF murder at that time, the new law proposals – consisting of measures 
from the previous package and some new proposals such as the Kronzeugenregelung – were 
now marketed as anti-terrorism-laws.274  
 
Rasterfahndung remained an unregulated instrument until the 90’s. It popped up now and then 
in legal proposals, for example in the discussion on the expansion of police competences in 
the fight against organised crime in 1990. Again in 1991 a law was proposed to codify the 
Rasterfahndung, this time for investigations on organized crime.275 The proposal was – as Der 
Spiegel put it – “a surprisingly confidence-inspiring law.” It was the result of a compromise 
between the CSU hardliners in Bayern and more prudent SPD regional interior ministers. Der 
Spiegel described the legal context of the proposal as follows: “The proposal is the result of a 
debate between security politicians of the regions and the coalition in Bonn that took many 
years. From now on the criminal procedure law will be amended for the first time with clear 
rules on the use of delicate investigative methods that have so far been practices in a legal 
void. The legalization of wiretapping, Rasterfahndung, and the use of undercover police 
officers will give competences to the criminal police that they have been using all along.”276 
The new law, Der Spiegel suggested, would not change or limit the current police practice, as 
the police laws of the Bundesländer were already directly or indirectly authorized for all of 
these investigative methods. In fact, Rasterfahndung had been allowed by the regional police 
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laws since the early 80’s.277 The police could still easily avoid the limits proposed in the new 
federal law by simply using the broad competences laid down in the regional police laws. 
 
In 1994, a new Rasterfahndungs-competence was introduced on a federal level. The newly-
developed electronic alien register, holding information on 8 million people, was tacitly 
opened to a kind of Rasterfahndung:278 The database could be searched for groups of people 
having the same “suspicious” characteristics. 
 
From the early 90’s until 2001, Rasterfahndung is not detectable in public discourse (different 
to the legal academic sphere). However, this changed radically after the attacks of 9/11. The 
so-called “sleeper cells” became one of the major discursive figures in Germany. Days after 
the terror attacks, the prime minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Fritz Behrens, argued that there 
were no less than 100 sleepers in Germany (the number seems to have been complete 
speculation).279 Berlin’s green justice senator Wolfgang Wieland supported a “small-scale 
Rasterfahndung” in order to uncover connections between pilot trainees or students and 
radical Islam.280 A few days after 9/11, all Länder started a Rasterfahndung.281 
 
A review of the articles on the Rasterfahndung that were published after 9/11 shows a rather 
distorted picture of the instrument’s first application in the 70’s. The term Rasterfahndung in 
its core meaning describes a system where data of unsuspicious citizens is filtered according 
to specific criteria: a specific combination of different characteristics that are unsuspicious in 
themselves which might lead to criminals. There is only one known example of the successful 
application of the instrument in the 70’s, namely the uncovering of the RAF terrorist Heißler 
in Frankfurt that was described earlier in this chapter. It is possible – though highly unlikely – 
that other successful cases have not been brought to the attention of the general public. 
However, given the fact that there were numerous attempts to completely legalize the 
instrument in the years which followed, it seems implausible that its proponents would not 
have happily pointed out these examples if they had existed. In the 80’s, the term 
Rasterfahndung became blurred and was often simply used to describe police access to non-
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police databases or the collection of data by the police without reasonable suspicion. In the 
articles following 9/11, the question whether Rasterfahndung had actually been a successful 
instrument of investigation was never raised. Rather, the mere fact that Rasterfahndung had 
been employed against terrorists in the past seems to have been taken as an indicator of the 
instrument’s usefulness. Despite its completely unimpressive track record, the BKA president, 
Ulrich Kersten, defended it as a “well-tried investigative instrument”.282 
 
It seems that the Rasterfahndung, enacted after 9/11in order to uncover “sleepers”, was 
mainly applied to students and was particularly targeted individuals originating from countries 
with Muslim populations, for engineering students and for frequent travellers (thus, 
individuals resembling the three 9/11 terrorists who had lived in Hamburg).283 The Humbolt 
University in Berlin and three students contested the legality of this measure and won. 
According to a law of the city of Berlin, the court argued that a current threat against the state 
or against a person was the precondition for a Rasterfahndung – a precondition that the 
government had not sufficiently substantiated.284 In Hessen, a court ruled against the 
Rasterfahndung for similar reasons after a Sudanese student sued.285 In both cases, the courts 
ruled that the use of the instrument was only permitted if the state could satisfactorily show 
the existence of a current threat. The decision was harshly criticised by Hessen’s interior 
minister, Volker Bouffier (CDU); he refused to delete the student data despite a court order.286 
The Düsseldorf appellate court (OLG Düsseldorf) decided, however, that the Rasterfahndung 
was illegal only insofar as German nationals were concerned and argued that a current threat 
did, in fact, exist.287 Similarly, the administrative courts in Mainz, Bremen and Hamburg 
ruled in favour of the Rasterfahndung.288 Protests against the Rasterfahndung became big 
especially at universities. Criticism was particularly levelled against the fact that the 
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Rasterfahndung was almost exclusively applied to foreign students.289 Student representatives 
supported dozens of lawsuits by affected students. 
 
Although the Rasterfahndung was stopped in some Bundesländer, more than 6 million data 
records had been examined until March 2002.290 However, Rasterfahndung failed to lead to a 
single new Al-Qaida suspect.291 Abdelghani Mzoudi, who was arrested in 2002 and who was 
presented as the first major investigative success of the instrument, had already been under 
police observation since September 2001.292 He was found innocent by a court in 2004. While 
176 proceedings had been initiated against terror suspects before 2003, all of them were based 
on “classic” police investigation.293 
 
Despite this complete lack of success, the Bundesverfassungsschutz was granted the 
competence to carry out Rasterfahndungen of databases of banks, telecommunication 
companies and airlines without judicial order in 2004 by the Terrorbekämpfungsgesetz.294 The 
law also allowed the inclusion of social data in the search. 
 
In 2006, however, the constitutional court delivered an astounding rebuke of the 
government‘s practice.295 The Rasterfahndung following the 9/11 attacks had not been legal, 
the court ruled, as there had not been a current threat in Germany. This was the precondition 
for employing the Rasterfahndung. Thus, the right to informational self-determination had 
been violated. For the employment of the instrument, the majority of the court argued that an 
abstract level of threat did not suffice.296 A court minority of two judges dissented, arguing 
that the situation after 9/11 – two of the terrorists having lived in Germany, and Al-Qaida 
having threatened to attack NATO-countries – was sufficient to fulfil the conditions stipulated 
by the law. This was the first time the constitutional court had to deal with the 
Rasterfahndung. 
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Despite the lack of investigative success297 and the limits erected by the constitutional court, 
Rasterfahndung against terrorists remained on the political agenda. In particular, the interior 
minister, Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), warned of terror threats and proposed new investigative 
competences frequently, such as the online-investigation on private computers, the right to 
shoot down a hijacked airplane, or a new terrorism-database. Der Spiegel criticised this, 
reporting that it would be “minister-alarmism”, a “dangerous game for the democratic 
state.”298 In December 2008, the CDU-SPD coalition passed a new BKA law that allowed 
Rasterfahndung to prevent danger (Gefahrenabwehr).299 
Conclusion 
 
Rasterfahndung miserably failed in the fight against terrorism both against the RAF and 
against Al Qaida. Since it was conceived by Horst Herold in the 70’s, it has had one single 
and isolated success in 1979. However, it was never conceived solely as an instrument in the 
fight against terrorism, although it was always marketed as such. In reality, in the 60’s and 
early 70’s it was believed that only if the police held sufficiently detailed information on the 
population, could they limit or even completely erase criminality. Thus, Rasterfahndung and 
related measures (such as Schleppnetzfahndung) were from the outset employed to document 
politically and socially deviant behaviour, supposedly the breeding ground for crime and 
terrorism.  
 
The preceding chapter shows that the development of the Rasterfahndung should not be 
reduced to the fact that from the 60’s on computerized investigative methods were introduced. 
Structurally, the tool should be understood as a continuation of an existing authoritarian, 
undemocratic state structure dating back to the 19th century. It was based on complicity 
between all state authorities routinely acting without any legal basis. In the 80’s, a counter-
movement became perceptible, pushing for two main goals: first, every state action should be 
based on an explicit legal authorization. The legal authorization of intrusive police measures 
in the 80’s and 90’s therefore does not merely indicate the growth of the surveillance state. It 
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also (and somewhat contradictorily) indicates the success of the rule of law movement, as 
persistent police practice finally needed to be put on a proper legal basis. Second, the growing 
collection and use of computerized data should be balanced with individual and collective 
rights of data protection. 
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§ 129a (formation of a terrorist organization) and related changes of 
the penal and procedural penal code (StGB and StPO) 
 
From the very beginning, RAF members were not only pursued for their individual crimes, 
but also as members of a criminal organization (§ 129 StGB).300 § 129 does not penalize the 
criminal act (such as murder) itself, but the membership “in a group aimed at committing 
criminal acts.” § 129 and its predecessors have all been used exclusively against political 
organizations, almost never against non-political criminal groups.301 (Professional criminals 
acting in a group were usually convicted under different provisions). § 129 had already been 
used against social democrats and other left organizations under Bismarck. The advantage of 
§ 129 for the prosecution was that – after proving the existence of an organization planning 
criminal acts – individuals could be prosecuted solely by proving their membership of the 
group without the necessity to establish their individual responsibility for a specific crime. 
Additionally, § 129 established the competence of the federal prosecution whose role of 
conducting investigations on a federal level was important 
 
After World War II, § 129 was frequently employed in the processes that led to the 
prohibition of communist organizations from August 1954 to May 1958 (Hauptausschuss für 
Volksbefragung, Abteilung Prozeßbetreuung der FDJ, Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ), 
Deutsches Arbeiterkommittee, Gesellschaft für deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft, 
Sozialistische Aktion, Zentralrat zum Schutz demokratischer Rechte).302 § 129 was, however, 
never used against members of the SS or of the Einsatzgruppen which were seen as criminal 
organizations as well.303 The 60’s brought a liberalization of the political penal law, and § 129 
was no longer employed except in two situations: against right extremist bomber Norbert 
Burger and against two neo-Nazis who had plotted to set fire to the Zentrale zur Aufklärung 
von NS-Verbrechen in Ludwigsburg.  
 
In 1973, § 129 was employed against the maoist “revolutionary KPD” after they had stormed 
the city hall in Berlin.304 Half a year later, however, the federal court of justice (BGH) 
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declared that the application of § 129 had been a breach of the law.305 Squatters in Hamburg, 
on the other hand, were convicted by the BGH of forming a criminal organization.306 
 
The first RAF processes in 1974 created a major problem for the prosecution, as the crimes 
committed by the 34-person-strong RAF could in many cases not be attributed to the RAF’s 
individual members with the necessary certainty.307 Proving the individual responsibility of 
the suspects was, however, a necessary precondition for a conviction. § 129, on the other 
hand, could be employed even against those RAF members who could not be connected to a 
specific crime. However, the maximum penalty under § 129 was 5 years, which was 
perceived as unsatisfactory by the prosecution. 
 
In 1975, the social-liberal coalition developed an anti-terrorism-package (dubbed Lex Baader 
Meinhof by Der Spiegel).308 It included the introduction of the new § 129a, criminalizing the 
formation of a terrorist organization. §129a was introduced after an initiative by the CDU-led 
Bundesländer Bayern and Baden-Württemberg. It was subsequently supported by the SPD-
FDP government that seemingly wanted to prove its tough approach to terrorism.309 The 
provision was not exclusively directed against terrorists, but also against individuals who 
supported a terrorist organization. Subsequently, it was frequently employed against people 
“promoting sympathy” for a terrorist group (Sympathiewerbung). 
 
§ 129a was and still is the gateway to a specific procedural and detention system.310 The 
competent institutions were the federal prosecution, the BKA and special judicial tribunals. 
Special detention rules included: a glass divider between the inmate and his or her attorney (§ 
148 Abs 2 StPO); surveillance of written communication between the inmate and the attorney 
(§148a StPO); solitary confinement (Isolationshaft); the unconditional obligation to take 
terrorist suspects into pre-trial custody – this included persons who had only handed out 
leaflets or participated in a demonstration (§ 112 III StPO);311 the prohibition on having more 
than three defence lawyers (§ 137 StPO); and the prohibition for a defence lawyer to defend 
                                                 
305 Viele Schultern, in: Der Spiegel 03/1974, 14.01.1974, p. 30 
306 „Der Endzweck ist unerheblich“, in: Der Spiegel 16/1975, 14.04.1975, p. 22 
307 Sprengstoff-Spuren unterm Fingernagel, in: Der Spiegel 26/1974, 24.06.1974, p. 29 
308 A la Klettermaxe, in: Der Spiegel 24/1975, 09.06.1975, p. 30 
309 „Das erinnert mich an Vogelfreiheit“, in: Der Spiegel 40/1977, 26.09.1977, p. 36 
310 Rolf Gössner: Politische Justiz im präventiven Sicherheitsstaat, in: Hamburg 1991, p. 37; „Besteht die RAF 
denn überhaupt noch?“, in: Der Spiegel 29/1981, 13.07.1981, p. 51 
311 „Besteht die RAF denn überhaupt noch?“, in: Der Spiegel 29/1981, 13.07.1981, p. 51; Rupert von Plottnitz: § 
129a StGB: Ein Symbol als ewiger Hoffnungsträger, in: Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2002) No. 8, p. 351 
 58
more than one defendant accused of the same crime (§ 146 StPO).312 Additional police rights 
stemming from § 129a were the right to search a complete building (not only a specific 
apartment) in which a suspect is assumed to be (§ 103 StPO); the establishment of 
checkpoints in the streets (§111 StPO); ID control and body search of unsuspicious passers-by 
if necessary for the investigation of a crime (§ 163b StPO); and the computerized registration 
of the so-collected data (Schleppnetzfahndung – § 163d StPO);313 These new police 
competences all had in common the fact that they did not require a reasonably sound 
suspicion by the police, a criterion which had until then be seen as a prerequisite for all StPO 
competences.314  
 
The new offenses were criticized – especially the “communication” (or “literary”) offences 
88a and 130a – in that they were greatly expanding the areas penalized by criminal law.315 § 
88a penalized the “anti-constitutional approval of violence” (this provision has since then 
been repealed); § 130a penalizes the publication of a text that aims to motivate people to 
commit violent acts; § 131 prohibits the glorification of violence and § 140 the public 
approval of violence.316 
 
In 1977 Der Spiegel reported that about 500 proceedings against supporters of the RAF had 
been initiated or completed. 40 of them concerned an indictment for § 129a.317 This partly 
concerned individuals who had given (intentionally or unintentionally, as many of them 
claimed) support to terrorists by providing a passport or by lending vehicles or apartments. It 
also affected individuals who had criticized the imprisonment conditions of the RAF inmates 
and had revealed sympathy for their cause. A doctor and a psychologist, having handed out 
leaflets against the imprisonment conditions, were convicted under § 129a.318 A social worker 
was convicted for promoting a terrorist organization because he had sprayed “RAF” on a 
concrete pillar.319 Squatters in Hamburg were convicted of creating a criminal organization in 
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1975,320 and in the early 80’s the provision was employed against the growing squatter scene 
in West Berlin. In the first half year of 1981, over 1000 squatters were detained or 
investigated.321 A librarian carrying posters advertising an authorized demonstration was held 
in pre-trial custody for over 6 weeks.322 A medical secretary was sentenced to a year in prison 
because she had written “war against palaces” and painted a black star on a subway car. A 
high school student and a photographer standing by were convicted because they had 
supposedly “shielded” her.323 In 1983, activists connected with the anarchist magazine 
“Radikal” were sentenced to more than two years imprisonment for promoting sympathy for a 
terrorist organization (§ 129a) by publishing a text written by the Revolutionäre Zellen.324 As 
the authors in “Radikal” were using false names, the prosecution randomly picked two 
persons active in the association responsible for editing the journal.325 Two book sellers were 
indicted under § 129a for having sold “Radikal”, but were later acquitted.326 Until 1978, 16 
RAF defence lawyers had been indicted under § 129a, among them Otto Schily.327 
 
In 1981 Der Spiegel reported that 150 cases of § 129a were pending with the federal 
prosecution that exclusively concerned people who had handed out leaflets or taken part in 
demonstrations against the prison conditions of the RAF prison inmates.328 The federal 
prosecutor, Kurt Rebmann, declared that in the first half year of 1981 263 cases of alleged 
advocating sympathy for a terrorist group were investigated.329 
 
An analysis published by the interior ministry in 1984 argued that these cases would form a 
“trend of the judiciary to realize the strategy, aims and intentions of the legislature. This partly 
creates the impression that the judiciary has intentionally sided with the other branches of 
government in order to signal the effective fight against terrorism. The judiciary did not react 
to the changing trend in legislative practice with a restrictive application of the new norms 
that would have led to a gentle implementation into the given dogmatic structure of well-tried 
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norms. Sometimes the judiciary even functioned as an intensifier, leading to results in excess 
of what the norms actually said.”330 Critics of the law such as the Hamburg court president, 
Helmut Plambeck, argued that the aggressive persecution of real or alleged sympathizers 
would establish greater solidarity with the terrorists.331 
 
It was reported that § 129a was regularly used against (non-violent) political groups by 
convicting members of wilful damage to property if they had illegally put up posters.332 70% 
of the §129a-cases in the 70’s did not concern terrorist activities, but merely the support of 
terrorist groups.333 They were predominantly aimed against people campaigning against the 
prison conditions of RAF terrorists. This trend grew even stronger in the 80’s. 
 
In 1979, § 129a was employed for the first time against neo-Nazis (“Rohwer-Rotte”).334 In 
1984, the prosecution did not, however, prosecute members of the neo-Nazi 
“Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann” as members of a terrorist organization – all being of German 
nationality and living in Germany at the time when the crimes took place – because the 
group’s leader, Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, had later fled to the Lebanon, which – according to the 
prosecution – made the application of § 129a impossible.335 This was particularly disturbing 
as the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann was – as was suspected – involved in the biggest single 
terrorism attack in Germany after 1945, the bombing of the Oktoberfest in 1981.336 The huge 
wave of right-extremist violence in the early 90’s was neither prosecuted under § 129 nor 
under § 129a.337 The federal prosecutor, Von Stahl, argued that right extremist violence was 
not systematically planned and therefore would not qualify for § 129a. In 2004, however, the 
neo-Nazi group “Freikorps” in Brandenburg was tried under § 129a.338 
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Der Spiegel argued in 1980 that § 129 and § 129a were increasingly used by the prosecution, 
to indict people against whom no sufficient individual evidence had been found: “A simple 
method has become dominant in political proceedings: if somebody is connected to a terrorist 
organization, he is responsible for the actions of all the group members. If there is little 
evidence against individual suspects, all of them are indicted for everything. […] This 
breaches the principle of individual responsibility, providing that each person should be tried 
individually and not as a substitute for the group.”339 In the period from 1980 to 1989, 2,131 
investigations under § 129a had been opened. But only 30 of them – a mere 1.4% of the cases 
– led to a conviction, a government survey showed.340  
 
In the trial against Fritz Teufel for his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the CDU 
politician, Peter Lorenz, in 1975 in Berlin the practice of the prosecution was heavily 
compromised.341 Teufel, an APO activist, was presented to the court as one of the prime 
kidnappers and was held in pre-trial confinement for over four years. Only when Teufel 
presented evidence that he had been living and working in Bochum during the complete 
kidnapping, was he subsequently released.  
 
In the coalition talks in 1980, the FDP attempted to reform §129a, but failed due to opposition 
from the SPD. § 88a and § 130a, however, were eliminated from the penal code.342 In the 
early 80’s, the attention of law-and-order politicians turned to violent demonstrations in the 
wake of the new social movements. The federal prosecutor, Kurt Rebmann, demanded the 
prosecution of militant demonstrators as “members of a criminal organization.”343 As 
mentioned, the provision was employed against squatters in Berlin in 1980. In 1985, when 
environmentalists bombed or cut down power poles near nuclear plants and threw Molotov-
cocktails at buildings of the chemical industry, the concept of “eco-terrorism” was developed 
by the federal prosecutor, who subsequently persecuted militant environmentalists as 
terrorists.344 In Niedersachsen the police investigated a citizens’ initiative opposing a nuclear 
plant, considering it tantamount to forming a criminal or terrorist organization due to the fact 
that anti-nuclear activists had demolished rail tracks and building sites. It was reported that 
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the police had registered over 3000 persons as potential eco-terrorists, which amounted to 
every 25th inhabitant of the area.345 
 
The anti-terrorism package of 1986 brought the re-introduction of § 130a and an expansion of 
§ 129a.346 The minimum penalty was raised to one year, while the maximum penalty was 
raised to ten years imprisonment. A broad list of crimes, including the “disruption of public 
enterprises” and the “disruption of telecommunication facilities” could now constitute 
terrorism.347 The amended provision, critics observed, was primarily aimed at prosecuting 
militant anti-nuclear activists sabotaging rail tracks and construction sites,348 although the 
murder of Gerold von Braunmühl by the RAF served as the primary justification.349  
 
In 1989, the radical feminist, Ingrid Strobl, was arrested and tried for supporting a terrorist 
organization.350 Strobl had bought an alarm clock that had subsequently been used in a 
bombing attack on the Lufthansa-headquarters in Köln. As Strobl had been publicly 
campaigning against sex tourism in Thailand that Lufthansa allegedly profited from, the 
prosecution argued that her support for the Revolutionäre Zellen was accordingly established. 
Strobl was sentenced to five years in prison. The BGH, however, annulled the sentence; the 
subsequent second trial brought a lighter sentence and she was put on probation. This and 
other trials in 1989 and 1990 – such as the appellate proceedings concerning the “Radikal” 
journalists that led to an annulment of their harsh sentences – were seen as a change in the 
application of § 129a by many commentators. In particular, the application of § 129a on leftist 
activism was reduced. The Strobl- and the “Radikal”-decisions showed that in the future a 
higher standard of evidence would be necessary for a conviction. 
 
After the Strobl trial, there are no further media reports on the application of § 129a. It seems 
that the application of the provision was greatly reduced. In the 80’s and 90’s, the opposition 
parties attempted to have § 129a repealed: the Green party in 1984, the SPD in 1989, and the 
PDS/Left party in the 90’s. When again in government in 1998, however, the red-green 
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coalition did not repeal § 129a despite the fact that it had not proved to be a useful 
prosecution tool, as legal commentators argued.351 After 9/11, a repeal became impossible. 
 
After 9/11, a new provision (§ 129b) was added to the penal code. It allowed the prosecution 
of members of foreign criminal or terrorist organizations.352 Similar to § 129a, advocating 
sympathy for terrorist organizations was also prohibited. Critics argued that conducting a 
proper inquiry abroad complying with the rule of law was difficult or impossible for the 
German police and that the distinction between “real” terrorists and for example other 
organizations persecuted by oppressive governments was sometimes hard to draw.353 Der 
Spiegel: “What would have happened if Stauffenberg had succeeded in fleeing to the US and 
if they had had a provision such as § 129b? In the eyes of the Nazis he was a member of a 
terrorist organization.”354 
 
In 2003, the justice minister, Brigitte Zypries, introduced an amendment – following a UN 
declaration and a EU directive – that partly reduced the scope of § 129a. Crimes could only 
constitute terrorism if they aimed at intimidating the population, at illegally coercing a public 
authority or at damaging the political, legal, economic or fundamental social structures of a 
state. Plans to expand § 129a were announced in 2007.355 The new § 129c and § 129d shall 
criminalize the planning of terrorist acts and shall include acts by individuals (not requiring a 
group of at least three such as the current § 129a).356 Preparatory actions such as collecting 
money, downloading bomb blueprints and recruiting potential collaborators shall be included 
as well. Critics voiced concern that everyday activities might already come under § 129c or 
d.357 
 
In May 2007, a raid involving over 900 police officers in 40 different places took place 
against individuals planning protests against the G-8-summit in Heiligendamm.358 The razzia 
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was made possible because the police relied on § 129a, and the prosecution subsequently 
opened investigations against 21 suspects.359 One of the suspects, Fritz Storim, was a lecturer 
at the University of Bremen. The police confiscated the list of participants of his courses.360 
The police and the federal prosecution connected two separate issues: they were looking for a 
group (“militante gruppe”) that had supposedly committed a number of arson attacks in the 
years before. And they argued that this group was connected to the G-8 protest movement.361 
In autumn 2007 the federal prosecution arrested three academics for alleged membership in 
the “militante gruppe,” supposedly the successor organization to the RAF. A strong suspicion 
could never be established, as the BGH decided in November 2007.362 Additionally, the 
alleged crimes of the “militante gruppe” – mostly arson on unmanned police and military 
vehicles – would not constitute terrorism.363 In January 2008, the BGH also declared that the 
police raids on anti-G-8-activists were illegal.364 The federal prosecution later closed all 
proceedings – in the case of the three alleged members of the “militante gruppe” after seven 
years of investigation.365 In April 2009 the BKA had to admit that evidence allegedly proving 
the existence of the “militante gruppe” had in fact been fabricated by the police.366 
 
Critics argued that the employment of § 129a had led to a criminalization of the protest 
movement. Especially after the two decisions of the BGH,367 major criticism of the federal 
prosecution’s frequent application of § 129a was voiced by politicians of all parties.368 The 
reason for this malpractice of the terrorism provision was, Der Spiegel argued, mainly that the 
prosecution of an alleged § 129a case allowed the employment of a vast number of 
investigative tools. The disproportionality in the application of § 129a is shown, Der Spiegel 
continued, by the official statistics: only one in five investigations even lead to a formal 
indictment.  
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Conclusion 
 
§ 129a was enacted in reaction to the difficulties faced by the prosecution to establish the 
individual responsibilities of the defendants during the Stammheim trials. However, the 
provision already had a political past as a tool against left organizations in the 19th and early 
20th century. In the 70’s and 80’s it served as one of the primary legal tools against individuals 
legally engaged in left radical politics. Especially in the 80’s it was used not only against 
militant environmental and anti-nuclear activists, but against large segments of the non-
militant new social movements as well. Thus, a tool initially conceived against RAF terrorism 
was subsequently expanded to serve against dissident, mostly non-violent and definitely non-
terrorist movements. While the application of § 129a against groups campaigning for better 
imprisonment conditions for the RAF prisoners can to some extent be explained by the 
assumption that these groups served as a supporting basis for the active RAF, this is not at all 
the case when it came to environmental and anti-nuclear groups. 
 
The provision is still used regularly against radical and mainstream left movements. The case 
of § 129 a shows clearly how provisions conceived and defended as tools against (RAF) 
terrorism were subsequently systematically abused against left political groups. 
 
§ 129a was and remains extraneous to the German penal code from a dogmatic point of view, 
as it is inconsistent with the principle of individual responsibility. This seems to be at least 
partly the reason why the law has provided so little help for the prosecutors to achieve 
convictions. Eventually, individual responsibility for a specific crime still needed and needs to 
be established. The success of the law from the perspective of the prosecution and the police 
lies with all the additional procedural and investigative rights that § 129a implies. 
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Kontaktsperregesetz – the communication ban law 
 
On 5 September 1977 the RAF kidnapped Hanns Martin Schleyer, president of the 
Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände), and murdered his four guards.369 The kidnappers demanded the release 
of eleven RAF prisoners including Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and Jan-Carl Raspe. The 
German government, a coalition of the social democrat SPD and the liberal FDP under 
Helmut Schmidt, the chancellor, reacted by establishing – using the phrase coined by 
Wolfgang Kraushaar – an “undeclared state of exception.”370 It formed an emergency task 
force (“großer Krisenstab”) comprising several ministers and the leaders of the conservative 
opposition parties, the CDU and the CSU. The task force lacked any legal basis and 
competence, but functioned as the main decision-making body during the weeks of Schleyer’s 
kidnapping and the subsequent hijacking of the Lufthansa airplane “Landshut.” The task force 
was willing to act outside constitutional limits, as the minutes from the meeting on 8 
September show. Chancellor Schmidt asked the participants to “think the impossible.” Among 
the ideas subsequently developed was the reintroduction of the death penalty – a proposal 
dismissed by the group. In an interview in early 1979 Schmidt said, referring to the hijacking 
of the Landshut: “I want to retroactively thank the German lawyers that they did not scrutinize 
our actions under constitutional law.”371 
 
During the night after the kidnapping the police immediately started to implement a 
communication ban on about 80 RAF prisoners.372 The communication ban included the 
prisoners communicating with their lawyers. On the next day, the federal justice minister, 
Hans-Jochen Vogel, justified the decision by referring to the concept of “rechtfertigender 
Notstand” in Article 34 of the penal code. Article 34 provides that an individual can 
legitimately attack the perpetrator in defence of his own or somebody else’s life or property. 
However, the provision solely authorizes individuals, not the state. As Kraushaar observes, 
the application of the provision by the state was in effect a supra-legal state of exception. The 
justice ministers of some of the Bundesländer refused to apply the communication ban as they 
deemed it illegal.  
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Most of the prisoners filed complaints against this administrative application of a 
communication ban. They were successful in some courts373, but the German constitutional 
court dismissed the prisoners’ complaints: “The Court concedes that the communication ban 
between attorneys and their imprisoned clients may also affect those lawyers that have not 
given reason to believe that they have consciously or unconsciously supported terrorist 
perpetrators or terrorist acts. This effect of the ban cannot be averted, as nobody can say from 
the outset which attorney will use his rights improperly and who will not. With regard to the 
necessary protection of a higher-ranking principle – protecting the life of Dr. Schleyer – this 
effect must be temporarily accepted.”374  
 
The government attempted to retroactively legitimize the communication ban by law. It took 
the parliament only five days to pass the proposal. A year later, Schmidt acknowledged the 
problematic character of the law in a speech before parliament: “I think that we went to the 
outer limits of the rule of law. All lawyers know that we had reached the limits by using 
Article 34. But we haven’t crossed the line.”375 
 
The main argument of the government defending the communication ban was the alleged 
threat that the prisoners communicated with the terrorists outside the prison and guided them. 
But only half a year later, the minister for justice, Vogel, told an Italian TV-station: “No, we 
never believed it [that the imprisoned RAF-members were guiding the other terrorists, ck], 
and to date I have not seen proof of it. There is no evidence that any planning or detailed 
guidance was conducted from the prison cells.”376 
 
The government also defended the law by referring to its exceptional character, arguing that it 
would only be applied in the given historic situation of RAF terrorists. In an interview in 
December 1977, Spiegel journalists accused the minister for justice, Hans-Jochen Vogel, of 
infringing civil liberties. Vogel responded that until then the law had only been applied once 
to 68 RAF prisoners during a period of 22 days.377 In an interview in early 1979 Schmidt tried 
to play down the impact of the communication ban law, saying: “The law was necessary at 
that time. It was stopped to be used a couple of weeks later. Today, it is a ‘fleet in being’ 
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[English in the original, ck]. It needs a formal decision to make it applicable. It shall only 
prevent contact between terrorists. And nobody of the Spiegel editorial staff has suffered, as 
nobody else in Germany has suffered. Only terrorists have suffered, and this was exactly the 
goal.”378 
 
The law on the communication ban was heavily criticized by left and liberal commentators, 
who argued that it would be part of a general reduction of civil rights.379 In 1978, Der Spiegel 
published the case of a female student who – wrongly accused of terrorism charges – would 
most probably have been found guilty if her defendant had not been able to look for defence 
witnesses from the first day of her arrest: “Eleonore Poensgen was lucky. Thanks to the 
prudence of her lawyer she was free after six days, on 7 August 1977. Had she been accused 
two months later, she probably would still be in custody, as the communication ban law came 
into effect on 2 October. (…) If Eleonore Poensgen had been subject to the communication 
ban prohibiting contact with her lawyer, she could neither have convinced her lawyer of her 
innocence nor could she have given him the facts necessary to develop a defence strategy. In 
fact, it would have been impossible for her lawyer to look for defence witnesses. The tram 
conductor – clearly remembering the student after four or five days – would probably have 
been lost as a witness if he had been asked two months later.”380 
 
Opposition to the law was reduced to a few parliamentarians of the governing SPD. The 
opposition parties – the conservative CDU and the CSU – supported the communication ban 
law, while the coalition partners, the SPD and FDP, tried to force their parliamentarians in 
line. Finally, only four members of parliament voted against the proposal. They were subject 
to fierce criticism by the SPD leaders. “There is no doubt about the necessity of the law in the 
steering committee of the party. But there is doubt about the position of some 
parliamentarians,” the secretary-general, Egon Bahr, said.381  
 
According to the law, a communication ban can be ordered if there is a current danger for the 
life, health or liberty of a person that originates from a terrorist organization and if this danger 
necessitates the interruption of the contact of a prisoner with the outside world and his or her 
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attorney. The prisoner must be convicted for or be suspected of terrorist acts.382 The order is 
given by the executive, not by a court.383 During the time of the communication ban, the 
prisoner is not allowed to have oral or written contact with his lawyer.384 
 
Despite heavy criticism, the communication ban law was upheld in a decision by the 
constitutional court.385 According to the court, the prohibition of contact with the defence 
lawyer constituted a breach of a fundamental right, which was, however, justified “in the 
interest of the self-preservation of the state and of its tasks to protect the life, well-being and 
freedom of its citizens.”386 
 
In the first years after the law was enacted, the issue of abolishing the communication ban law 
was raised from time to time by the left-leaning media. In 1980 – an election year - parts of 
the FDP demanded the abolition of the law in an attempt to raise its liberal profile, as Die Zeit 
remarks: “The liberals have discovered the rule of law as an area where they can distinguish 
themselves most visibly. (…) the FDP wants to drop the communication ban law completely. 
(…) But they secretly know that the Chancellor will refuse to follow this demand anyway.”387 
In autumn 1979, ten FDP parliamentarians attempted to abolish – among other terrorism-
related laws – the law on the communication ban. But in an answer to a parliamentary inquiry, 
the government described the law as having been a successful anti-terrorist instrument – “to 
the surprise of all legal experts,” as Die Zeit put it.388  
 
Journalist Joachim Wagner gave an interesting insight into the political dynamics that led to 
the normalization of the communication ban law: “When the legal experts of all the 
parliamentary factions objected to a time limit for the communication ban law, they wanted to 
avoid that ‘special measures are applied to concrete situations’ (Benno Erhard, CDU) or that a 
‘law of exception’ (Ingrid Matthäus-Meier, FDP) was passed. Most of all, it seems that they 
want to keep up appearances: that the legislator does not react to exceptional circumstances in 
its fight against terrorism. For a critical observer, this is a pretty obvious attempt to distract, as 
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the interior minister, Maihofer, and ministers of justice, Jahn and Vogel, and the chancellor, 
Schmidt, are touring the country in defence of the anti-terrorism measures. Their argument: 
the challenge of the state by the terrorists has created an exceptional situation that demands 
and justifies exceptional measures. (…) There is a great risk that the often ill-prepared anti-
terror-laws enacted in times of fear and hysteria will be ‘perpetuated’ in our legal system. All 
attempts of some SPD- and FDP-parliamentarians to get rid of the most outrageous excesses 
have been without success so far.”389 From the beginning, the debate on security laws had 
been the arena for the conflict between the government and the opposition on who was 
tougher on terrorism. Wagner: “This anti-terrorism legislation can only be justified by one 
argument: to defang the issue of ‘terrorism’ for the upcoming elections. But this argument 
will be exactly the reason why the necessary revision of the anti-terror-laws will not take 
place in the near future. The government will not start to question those laws that they 
themselves passed. There is no better gift for the opposition. The government will not admit 
their failures – which is exactly why they cannot support the abolition of the communication 
ban law.”390  
 
In 1982, a conservative-liberal coalition took over the government. Attempts of some FDP 
politicians to revise the law in the conservative-liberal coalition had little chances of success 
against the bigger conservative coalition partner.391  
 
The law on the communication ban has never been repealed but it has not been used since 
1977. A revision in 1985 (introducing § 34a EGGVG) provided for the appointment of 
another lawyer for the prisoner as a contact person during the time of the communication 
ban.392 Legal commentators argued that if a total ban of communication for terrorist prisoners 
was not necessary and an appointed, “neutral” contact person would not undermine the state’s 
safety,393 then the assumptions underlying the communication ban were brought into question. 
Wilhelm Krekeler: “The lawmaker has not made it clear why communication by the prisoner 
with the outside with the help of an appointed lawyer may be dangerous, but via the contact 
person is not. The chance that the appointed lawyer or the contact person transmits messages 
is – theoretically – the same.”394 
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After the red-green coalition came into power in 1998, new attempts were made to repeal the 
communication ban. Different organisations – among them the Union of German Lawyers 
(Deutscher Anwaltsverein) and the Green party – demanded the repeal of the law, arguing that 
it neither had any legal significance after 1977 nor that there was any further use for the 
law.395 But in a response to a parliamentary inquiry of the PDS/Left party, various justice 
ministries of the Bundesländer argued that the law was still necessary. It was, the argument 
went, justified by the possibility of future terrorist threats.396 
Conclusion 
 
The communication ban law has never been repealed. It was only applied once in order to 
retroactively justify a communication ban executed in September 1977. Without doubt, the 
law was unacceptable from a fundamental rights perspective, as it took from the prisoners the 
most basic right of access to legal defence. This was indirectly acknowledged by the reform 
that defanged the law in 1985.  
 
The law was also completely useless from a practical perspective, as the underlying 
assumption that the RAF prisoners would in some form guide the operations of the terrorists 
outside was neither true and nor did the leading politicians ever believe in it. Thus, as an anti-
terrorist measure, the law failed completely. 
 
Today, the communication ban is without doubt a dead law. However, the communication ban 
law is probably the best-known terrorism-related law enacted during the RAF period. When 
analyzed apart from the other – less known – terrorism-related laws, it might lead to the 
conclusion that the legislation enacted during the RAF period – though perhaps questionable 
from a rule of law perspective – has been repealed or at least neutralized and is therefore 
irrelevant for today. However, this conclusion is misguided as the communication ban is the 
exception to the rule. As shown in the previous chapters, most terrorism-related laws have not 
only not been repealed, but have been massively expanded since the 70’s. 
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Radikalenerlaß 
 
In late 1971 it was reported that some Bundesländer had adopted policies to ban members of 
radical organizations from taking up jobs in public service, the SPD led Hamburg being the 
first.397 Individuals already in employment would be fired.398 In January 1972, the prime 
ministers of the Bundesländer and the SPD chancellor, Willy Brandt, agreed together to adopt 
this policy.399 Two declarations – one for the Bundesländer and one for federal employees – 
provided that candidates “pursuing anti-constitutional activities” should not be appointed.400 
Of the eleven signatory minister-presidents of the Bundesländer, six were SPD members, five 
were from the CDU/CSU. The declarations were formalized in a joint decree on 18 February, 
1972. 
 
One of the earliest reported cases concerned Rütger Booß, an applicant for a teaching position 
in Bonn. Booß was a member of the German communist party (Deutsche Kommunistische 
Partei – DKP) and had been a student representative at the University of Bonn. The new 
president of the federal Bundesverfassungsschutz, Günter Nollau, – ex-member of the NSdAP 
– warned in an interview that a growing number of radicals (from the left and the right) would 
aim to infiltrate the public service.401 In early 1972, the CDU chairman, Rainer Barzel, 
demanded a constitutional clause that would ban communists from public service.402 As the 
prime ministers’ decision only contained a general principle, the execution was controversial 
from the outset. In Hamburg, members of the extreme right NPD and the communist DKP 
were denied entry to the public service, despite the fact that both parties were legal.403 The 
Verfassungsschutz started to routinely check applicants for public service entry.404 In the 
beginning, the practice concerned mainly teachers who had been members of the DKP or 
some affiliated organization. But soon the Radikalenerlass did not only affect individuals with 
communist or APO affiliations. The political scientist and SPD adviser, Wolf-Dieter Narr, 
was barred from taking up employment at the University of Hanover because he had been 
affiliated with a labour union group which campaigned against the emergency laws of 1968 
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and a group which organized the Easter marches against nuclear weapons.405 Very soon, not 
only teachers and professors were affected, but anybody working for a public entity could be 
rejected.406 During the following year, screenings of applicants and of public servants became 
an all-embracing operation. In October 1973 alone, 64,800 applicants were screened in 
Baden-Württemberg, and 55 of them were rejected with the agreement of the 
Radikalenerlass.407 All in all, 3.5 million persons (applicants and public servants) were 
screened, 2,250 were barred from application, and 2,000 to 2,100 public servants were subject 
to disciplinary proceedings, of which 256 were dismissed.408 Other authors give higher 
numbers of victims, based on the numbers published by labour unions and citizens’ 
committees.409 From the very beginning, critics complained that in practice leftists were 
almost exclusively affected.410 In total, Braunthal reports that at least 92% of the barred 
applicants were leftists.411 
 
The Radikalenerlass was not the first occupational ban to be enacted after 1945. In 1950, the 
conservative Adenauer government passed a “Decision on political activity by members of 
the public service directed against the democratic basic order.”412 It provided that membership 
in thirteen communist groups and three fascist groups would be incompatible with public 
service. The decision was put into effect by the Adenauer-Heinemann decree and was also 
applied by the Bundesländer. In 1951, the government filed to interdict the KPD, leading to 
the party’s prohibition in 1956. There is no direct statistical data available on the number of 
civil servants dismissed on the grounds of the decree. However, in light of the government’s 
long-running anti-communist campaign and the high number of arrests and subsequent 
convictions, the KPD’s prohibition arguably points to a rather significant number. Between 
1951 and 1961, over 500,000 investigation proceedings were initiated and over 10,000 
criminal proceedings were carried out.413 
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The legal basis for barring individuals involved in radical political activity from public service 
was usually a very general good conduct clause in public employment law. The federal civil 
service law of 1950 provided that an applicant for public service must “be able to guarantee 
that he will defend at any time the free and democratic order Freie und demokratische 
Grundordnung in the spirit of the Grundgesetz.”414 Under the same law, a public servant 
must “through his entire behaviour acknowledge the free and democratic order and be ready 
to maintain it.”415 In Hamburg the practice was based on a clause in the law on public servants 
stating: “Only someone who can guarantee that he will stand up for the free democratic order 
at all times can be appointed to the public service.”416 In practice, this line could be crossed 
rather easily, as the mayor of Hamburg, Hans-Peter Schulz, explained in an interview: “It is 
not necessary to measure somebody’s hostility against the constitution. The doubt that the 
applicant is not willing to stand up actively for the constitution is sufficient.”417 This reversed, 
critics argued, the principle of the presumption of innocence.  
 
The 1972 Radikalenerlass should be understood in conjunction with the government’s new 
approach towards the DDR, Axel Schildt argued.418 Brandt and foreign minister Egon Bahr 
had shifted Germany’s politics towards the DDR from the cold-war inspired, aggressive 
Hallstein-doctrine to a policy of mutual rapprochement. This was heavily criticised by the 
CDU/CSU.419 Brandt’s consent to the Radikalenerlass, Schildt argues, was an attempt to 
appear tough on communists in Western Germany despite the shift in foreign policy. 
 
From early on, critics pointed out that the constitutional court had followed a different, more 
nuanced line towards radical organizations. Most notably, the court had stated that “nobody 
can claim the unconstitutionality of a party as long as the constitutional court has not ruled on 
this issue.”420 The constitutional protection of parties must necessarily also apply to their 
individual members: “If it were possible to prosecute individual members on account of their 
membership, the constitutional protection of the parties would be eroded.”  
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The first major public debate on the decree was sparked when Volker Götz, a communist, 
applied for the position of a judge in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Götz was member of the DKP and 
a DKP district leader in Düsseldorf. The court president refused to appoint Götz, but was 
overruled by the SPD minister for justice, Diether Posser, causing a coalition crisis.421 The 
conflict, however, only concerned the question as to whether communist activists should 
always be banned from public service or whether exceptions should be possible in individual 
cases.422  
 
The SPD prime ministers were confronted with growing internal criticism over the following 
year.423 It was argued that the policy was leading to denunciation. Additionally, the vagueness 
of the provision was criticised: it was not at all clear on what grounds somebody could be 
banned from public service, making the decision subject to the will of individual officials.  
 
A direct explanation for the Radikalenerlass was the fear of DDR-spies in public service, 
which was triggered by the regular uncovering of spies. The most notorious case was the 
Guillaume-affair, where a staff member close to the chancellor, Willy Brandt, was uncovered 
as a DDR-spy.424 In the late 70’s, three DDR agents working as secretaries for CDU leaders 
such as Kurt Biedenkopf were uncovered.425 However, the decree was from the beginning 
never intended as a counter-intelligence instrument, and in public discourse this argument 
never played an important role. 
 
Primarily, the Radikalenerlass was a reaction to the student protest movement that erupted in 
1968.426 A student leader, Rudi Dutschke, had called for “the long march through the 
institutions with the goal of destroying and softening the established apparatus.”427 Now parts 
of the right feared that the ex-student rebels would actually try to realize this goal.428 Der 
Spiegel quoted the mayor of Hamburg, Peter Schulz, saying: “What else does the phrase of 
the long march refer to but to somebody trying to blow up the system from the safe haven of 
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public service.”429 Obviously this fear was particularly strong in regard to teaching staff, they 
having the possibility to influence the young. The Radikalenerlass was seen as a rollback of 
what was perceived as a wave of radicalism in public institutions, mainly the universities.  
 
To contain radical leftists was not only an interest of the conservatives, but it was also an 
interest of the social democrats when their youth organization (Jusos) grew close to the 
communists and the APO during the student protests, Der Spiegel wrote.430 Similarly, the 
social democratic leadership of the labour unions felt threatened by a small far left opposition 
and tried to neutralize it.431 Communist activists using the union infrastructure to recruit new 
members were often thrown out without any formal procedure. Opposition against the 
Radikalenerlass within the governing parties was radically quelled.432 
 
Some historians point out that since the 70’s the concept of “innere Sicherheit” had become a 
dominant discursive element in Germany, shaping the public and political reaction to 
perceived security threats, such as terrorism.433 Innere Sicherheit – meaning security inside 
Germany – described a growing awareness of criminality (partly due to a rise in crime rates) 
as a result of social movements seen as disruptive to the social order.434 This growing 
importance of police and security matters in the political discourse from the 70’s on was 
reflected, Weinhauer argues, in the eagerness of the new SPD/FDP-coalition to make fighting 
crime a major political issue.435 However, Weinhauer continues, crime prevention was seen in 
the later 60’s and early 70’s as a measure to enhance social security, and therefore as a matter 
of the social state in contrast to the law-and-order perspective under which crime prevention 
is seen today. Security was seen as a core competence of the SPD from the mid-60’s to the 
early 70’s, Frank Fischer argues.436 However, the term innere Sicherheit was from early on 
heavily employed as a fighting word by the conservative press and parties.437 
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So, similar to other security laws passed during the time of RAF terrorism, the 
Radikalenerlass was also a tool of party politics. Heinz Kühn, the prime minister of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, argued in an interview: “You know the evolutionary history: […]; the 
attempt to play up the Baader-Meinhof-crisis to a psychosis in order to lure frightened citizens 
to polls for the law-and-order party CDU.”438  
 
Despite the fact that the Radikalenerlass had been in force and could be applied at will by the 
different Bundesländer, the CDU followed the strategy of criticizing the SPD for the 
restrained application of the measure in some of the SPD-led Bundesländer. The chancellor, 
Willy Brandt, was under pressure to go along with the CDU’s law-and-order approach. 
Dissent within the party was quelled.439 Brandt tried to regain the initiative by shifting to the 
right with a proposal that would transform the Radikalenerlass into a federal law. The two 
contradicting principles of the Grundgesetz – allegiance of civil servants to the state (Art 33), 
on the one hand, the right not to be penalized for membership in a non-prohibited party (Art 
21), on the other – should, Brandt said, be answered in favour of the former.440 The law 
proposals failed to pass due to CDU/CSU opposition in the second chamber, the Bundesrat. 
 
In May 1975 the constitutional court passed a stunning decision on the Radikalenerlass.441 
Contrary to its own decision in 1961, it ruled that governments may define a party as “hostile 
to the constitution” without a formal prohibition of the party by the constitutional court. Thus, 
being a member of a legal party may be sufficient reason to reject an individual from public 
service. The allegiance of the civil servant to the state, the court argued, was more important 
than the right not to be discriminated against as a member of a non-prohibited party. 
Moreover, this applied not only to civil servants, but also to employees having a private 
contract with a public entity. The court – usually calming and limiting overzealous activities 
of the executive in regard to constitutional rights – passed a judgement allowing the ongoing 
practice to take root.442 The government attempted to establish the Radikalenerlass as a 
federal law, but was again blocked by the CDU/CSU in the Bundesrat that wanted no 
limitation of the competences further expanded by the court ruling.443 
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In late 1975 it was reported that more and more left SPD and FDP members were now 
affected by the Radikalenerlass.444 Members of the SPD student organization, Sozialistischer 
Hochschulbund, had almost no chances of public employment in Bayern, Der Spiegel wrote. 
The few limitations enacted by the constitutional court’s ruling – no general refusal of 
members of certain parties and the requirement to assess the individual case – were largely 
ignored. In 1976, the London newspaper Times wrote that the German situation was 
reminiscent of “McCarthyism.”445 Many other Western European newspapers reacted 
similarly,446 and the French president, Mitterrand, campaigned actively against the decree.447  
 
By 1975, it seems that the Radikalenerlass had acquired a life of its own, independent of 
immediate political interest of the governing parties in the Bundesländer. While some social 
democratic leaders were openly criticising the decree, some SPD-led Bundesländer were 
applying it with the same ferocity as the CDU-led regions. The reason for this seems to be 
that the public institutions themselves – sometimes against the explicit will of the political 
appointees – were eager to execute the decree.448 
 
In political discourse, the Radikalenerlass was utilized both by the far left and the right. The 
communist side especially employed protests against what they called the occupational ban 
(“Berufsverbot”) for mobilization.449 The right – especially the CSU – used the threat of 
communist teachers or police officers to rally followers and to dissuade left-leaning 
individuals from political activism. It seems that the perceived hegemony of the radicals 
among the youth in and after 1968 was quickly replaced by a conservative rollback450, 
especially among the young. From the mid-seventies on, the conservative youth organization, 
Junge Union, drew more members than its left and liberal counterparts, Der Spiegel 
reported.451 Especially the Junge Union employed the Radikalenerlass in their campaign 
                                                 
444 Auf dem Weg zur Gesinnungsschnüffelei, in: Der Spiegel 50/1975, 08.12.1975, p. 28; Hinrich Enderlein 
(1978), p. 1469; Erich Roßmann: Funktion und folgen der Berufsverbote, in: Blätter für deutsche und 
internationale Politik (1982) No. 1, p. 90 
445 Radikalen-Suche: McCarthy auf deutsch? in: Der Spiegel 16/1976, 12.04.1976, p. 52 
446 Dokumentation zur internationalen Kritik der Berufsverbote und anderer Rechtstendenzen in der BRD, in: 
Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (1976) No. 9, p. 1072 
447 Gerard Braunthal (1990), p. 68 
448 Das ist politischer Exorzismus, in: Der Spiegel 21/1978, 22.05.1978, p. 36 
449 Rote Hilfe West-Berlin: Staatsgewalt, Reformismus und die Politik der Linken, in: Kursbuch (1973) 31 
450 Sebastian Scheerer (1988), p. 368; Axel Schildt (2004), p. 449; Helmut Gollwitzer: Die Bundesrepublik – 
Insel der Reaktion in Europa, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (1976) No. 10, p. 1144 
451 Jugend ´76: Lieber Gott, mach mich krumm, in: Der Spiegel 15/1976, 05.04.1976, p. 46 
 79
against the left, and also attacked liberal-minded teachers.452 Correspondingly, the CDU/CSU 
employed the Radikalenerlass in the campaign for the federal elections in 1976. In an 
interview, the CDU candidate for the interior ministry, Alfred Dregger, tried to link the policy 
against critical-minded civil servants with a security threat: “It is obviously true that crime 
cannot be solely contained by police means. Inner security is already affected when young 
people are not being taught public spirit, duty and respect towards the democratic state and its 
order, but instead learn to seek conflict and class warfare, to question – and thus to make 
questionable – all fundamental values of our community, when the orientation of a solid value 
system is being taken away from them.”453 
 
In 1978 it was reported that applicants for civil service posts who had been rejected on 
account of the Radikalenerlass and who then subsequently sued in court and won, were still 
not hired by some of the Bundesländer. In these cases, the executive was following a policy 
of ignoring judicial orders on a systematic basis, wiping out the possibilities of effective legal 
remedy for the affected individuals.454 Also in 1978, the first case became public where an 
applicant for a teaching position was rejected not because of communist ties (which he did not 
have), but because he “did not distance himself strongly enough from communist goals.” 
Without sufficient anti-communist sentiments, the court upholding the decision argued that he 
would not be able to identify and fight communist threats to the free democratic order.455 A 
police officer and SPD-member was denied status as an employee for an indefinite time 
because he had been handing out flyers against the Radikalenerlass in his spare time.456 
 
In late 1978 the first prime minister – the mayor of Hamburg, Hans-Ulrich Klose – declared 
that the obligatory screening of all applicants would be discontinued. Screening would in 
future be restricted to civil servants working in “security-sensitive” fields such as the 
police.457 The practice of requesting information by the Verfassungsschutz from all applicants 
(“Regelanfrage”) was dropped. 
 
In 1979, it seems that the Radikalenerlass ceased to be of primary importance in political 
discourse. In 1979 news reporting on the decree dropped to less than one third of the number 
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of articles in 1978, the year that the issue was most dominant in public discussion. The 
Hamburg initiative was taken up by the SPD-FDP government, which prohibited the 
Regelanfrage within its own sphere.458 The new guidelines, enacted in January 1979, 
stipulated that the hiring process should proceed under the presumption of loyalty of the 
applicant.459 This did not, however, apply to the jurisdiction of the Bundesländer. Meanwhile, 
abolishing the Radikalenerlass created heavy opposition within the FDP and especially the 
SPD, as the decree had ostensibly undergone a strong normalization process. In most 
Bundesländer the practice was continued, and moreover, the principles of the Radikalenerlass 
were still applied in federal fields covered by the government’s prohibition, for example in the 
case of the federal postal service.460 
 
While the SPD-FDP coalition was finally attempting to put an end to the Radikalenerlaß, the 
pursuit of alleged extremists in public service continued. Especially the federal disciplinary 
office (Bundesdisziplinaranwalt) continued to pursue communist activists.461 The courts, on 
the other hand, sometimes reacted to the government’s change of direction. The federal 
disciplinary court ruled that an employee in the postal service could remain a DKP member as 
long as he refrained from any political activity.462 It seems that the court reacted with this 
ruling to the minister for post, Kurt Gescheidle, who had argued that non-security related jobs 
might be held by DKP members who had strongly opposed it in the previous years. However, 
no general line in judicial decisions can be found: some courts tended to decide in favour of 
the communists, some against them.  
 
The change from a general screening practice (Regelanfrage) to an individual screening 
practice in the early 80’s, Ingrid Kurz and Erich Roßmann argue, was a success of the anti-
Radikalenerlass-movement. 463 However, Berufsverbote as an instrument against left activists 
was continued to be employed by the public administration and upheld by the labour courts. 
The employment practice in most of the SPD-led Bundesländer had not changed; the same 
was true for areas controlled by the federal government, such as the railways and the postal 
service. 
 
                                                 
458 Gerard Braunthal (1990), p. 111; Radikalenerlaß entschärft, in: Der Spiegel 02/1979, 08.01.1979, p. 16 
459 Gerard Braunthal (1990), p. 111 
460 SPD: „Ende der Ära Stillgestanden“?, in: Der Spiegel 49/1979, 03.12.1979, p. 21 
461 Gerard Braunthal (1990), p. 115; Luft raus, in: der Spiegel 14/1980, 31.03.1980, p. 27 
462 Luft raus, in: der Spiegel 14/1980, 31.03.1980, p. 27 
463 Ingrid Kurz, Erich Roßmann: Berufsverbotspraxis und Liberalisierungslegende, in: Blätter für deutsche und 
internationale Politik (1980) No. 7, p. 821 
 81
The practice not to employ and even dismiss communist civil servants also continued in the 
years after the election of the CDU-FDP government.464 Under the new government, 
dismissal proceedings rose sharply in numbers.465 In 1981, the constitutional court ruled that 
the dismissal of a communist telephone technician, Hans Peter, who had extraordinarily 
positive work credentials, was legal, signalling a continuation of the Radikalenerlass on the 
judicial side.466 The constitutional court’s decision in 1983 in favour of a communist activist 
who the bar association tried to keep from becoming an advocate exemplifies how many – 
public, semi-public, private – institutions took the Extremistenerlass as some sort of blanket 
clause to keep left political activists from all kinds of employment, not only in public 
administration.467 While the court ruled that it was unconstitutional to keep somebody 
completely from (private) occupation, individuals continued to be dismissed under the 
Radikalenerlass. The federal administrative court had – taking a completely different 
direction – allowed the dismissal of public servants who were candidates for general elections 
on a DKP list.468 The new conservative government used the verdict to pursue a further purge 
of the public service.469 
 
In the second half of the 80’s, media reports on the Radikalenerlass subsided, signalling an 
end to the application of the decree in most Bundesländer. In those regions where the SPD 
won a majority (Nordrhein-Westphalen, Schleswig-Holstein, Hessen, Hamburg, Bremen), the 
Radikalenerlass was repealed,470 and no new cases were opened from the mid-80’s on.471 The 
government and the CDU/CSU-led regions, on the other hand, were considering expanding 
the decree to persons who had been employed in the DDR. In 1986, Horst Bethge claims that 
a reduction of cases was perceptible even in the CDU-led Bundesländer as a reaction to the 
anti-Radikalenerlass protest movement.  
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The reunification in 1990 led to a revived debate on the Radikalenerlass, as a great number of 
ex-DDR citizens was now facing severe consequences.472 German politicians disagreed on 
how to deal with the communist past of the DDR citizens, and especially with higher 
functionaries and Stasi spies.473 Conservative voices in the CDU/CSU, such as the minister 
for the interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, were advocating only limited screening of DDR 
functionaries, and so breaking with their own approach in Western Germany.474  
 
In the Unification Treaty of 1990, again a functional Radikalenerlass in connection with a 
Regelanfrage was established for applicants from the ex-DDR, in particular with regard to ex-
employees of the ministry of state security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS).475 The 
number of affected individuals is unknown. The practice was dropped in 2000.  
 
By 1992, all Bundesländer had finally repealed the Radikalenerlass.476 The Regelanfrage – a 
screening of every applicant by the Verfassungsschutz – was replaced by the Bedarfsanfrage – 
a screening of an individual applicant if there are concrete signs that he or she opposes the 
free democratic order. In 1995, the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) ruled that the 
Radikalenerlass violated the freedom of expression, the freedom of coalition and the principle 
of proportionality.477 
Conclusion 
 
The Radikalenerlass is an interesting example of how legislation related to terrorism does not 
necessarily follow either the “left” or the “right” development paradigm. Obviously some 
resemblance to the “right” paradigm can be argued: the Radikalenerlass was one among many 
security laws passed during the period of public RAF fear, reaching its peak in 1977 and 1978 
during the peak of RAF terrorism. It was rolled back in the 80’s and finally repealed in the 
early 90’s. However, the decree was never intended primarily as an anti-terrorism tool. 
Rather, it was used right from the beginning to purge the public service from communists.  
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But while the Radikalenerlass initially targeted communists, it quickly affected an extensive 
range of left-leaning individuals, including peace activists and SPD members. Right-wing 
extremists, on the other hand, were never seriously targeted by the decree (I found but a few 
examples), making it a genuine tool against left activists. The decree was enacted and 
employed both by conservative and social democrat politicians. Major figures in the SPD 
distanced themselves from the decree after its effects on their own constituency became more 
visible. However, the decree remained in force for many years, not only because it was 
continuously supported by the CDU/CSU, but also because it was supported by major parts of 
the bureaucracy. 
 
Arguably, the decree was fully phased out in the early 90’s because it had lost its usefulness 
after the collapse of East Germany. However, it is also important to emphasize the importance 
of the political opposition to the decree from the radical left, the left-liberal media (such as 
Der Spiegel), from intellectuals such as Heinrich Böll and Jürgen Habermas and the left 
factions of the SPD and the FDP. The SPD general convention had already vowed to repeal 
the decree in 1981, and the SPD-led Bundesländer repealed the Radikalenerlass in the mid-
80’s. 
 
The Radikalenerlass seems to be a prime example of the security discourse being a de-
normalizing discourse. One of its main characteristics was that it never had a clearly defined 
legal foundation. Rather, it was based on a cryptic commandment of allegiance for public 
servants, leaving the application completely to the will of the executive. For twenty years, the 
possibility of legal remedy for an individual depended on the region, on the court, and on the 
judge. Radicalism and terrorism were mostly little more than a pretence to establish an anti-
leftist system based on political arbitrariness. And only three years after the enactment of the 
decree the system had already been stabilized and normalized to such an extent that it took 
many years and major political efforts to have it finally repealed.  
 
Today, the Radikalenerlass is commonly understood to be an expression of the anti-left 
sentiments of the political right and parts of the SPD in the wake of a general perceived threat 
by East Germany, the radical left and from left terrorism in the 70’s. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that the primary function of the decree was to purge the bureaucracy 
first of communists and then of leftists, and to delegitimize the left movement in general. For 
the SPD, the instrument that they hoped would target their left opponents quickly backfired. 
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The fear that public servants might spy for East Germany to some extent triggered the 
Radikalenerlass. However, as critics have frequently argued, the decree has in no way been a 
functional tool to uncover spies, who abstain from DKP membership for obvious reasons.  
 
It is important to note that the Radikalenerlass – in the view of its critics478 – was based on a 
pre-democratic, authoritarian state ideal, where public servants owed total professional and 
personal allegiance to the state. This view is supported by the fact that the main target of the 
Radikalenerlass was always teachers and not, for example, officials in security-relevant 
institutions. The real fear was that young civil servants – especially teaching staff – influenced 
by the anti-authoritarian positions of the student protest movement would subvert the 
fundamental structures of the state. 
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Conclusion 
In the preceding chapter I have attempted to give an account of the development of the major 
anti-terrorism laws enacted in Germany from the 70’s onwards under the assumption that the 
term “terrorism” has a specific (political- and legal-) discursive function, namely the 
delegitimization of persons or groups. The technique of recounting the evolution of the 
different laws one after another aimed to show different trends, developments or influences 
without subjecting them to a mono-causal narrative. In this chapter, I will attempt to flesh out 
and systematize these asynchronous and multi-causal developments. 
German terrorism laws as a continuation of a pre-democratic, 
authoritarian tradition 
 
In April 1968, Hans Magnus Enzenberger’s leftist quarterly Kursbuch published a special 
issue on the incidences of the summer of 1967479 when the demonstration against the Persian 
Shah was violently dispersed by the police and Benno Ohnesorg, a student, was shot by the 
police. This analysis is interesting because it articulates the idea that the public authorities, 
and especially the police, were still dominantly working in a pre-democratic, authoritarian 
tradition that reached back to the Nazi-time and the decades before.  
 
I will try to substantiate the idea that the state’s reaction to the student protest movement and 
later to terrorism – for example in the form of the terrorism laws – is rooted in this anti-
democratic authoritarian tradition. I aim to develop this idea – which was a common argument 
in the 60’s and 70’s – against the rival claim that the state’s reaction was merely a response to 
the student protests and to the threat of terrorism, which in my opinion still dominates our 
view of the 60’s and 70’s.  
 
In 1967 the police was para-militaristic in its competences, its training and its strategy.480 
Werner Kuhlmann, president of the union of police officers, argued at a union convention in 
1976: “Who would be surprised that a police drilled to do military operations will one day act 
less civilized than the public expects it to?”481 Kuhlmann was campaigning against police 
service regulations such as: “Raiding patrols are the carriers of the battle, which is often 
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characterized by close combat with hand grenades, pistols and machine guns.” The police 
competence of the “exceptional order services” included fighting “civil disturbances”, 
“disturbers” and “terror actions and sabotage.”482 The emergency laws of 1968 allowed the 
use of the army and the border patrol within Germany in exceptional situations (Art 35 
Grundgesetz). The riot police (Bereitschaftspolizei) was equipped with grenade launchers, 
machine guns, hand grenades and armoured gun vehicles. The police of West Berlin – 
responsible for the violent reaction to the demonstrations in 1967 – had a military commando 
structure. The Berlin police president, Erich Duensig, who was a former 
Wehrmachtsgeneralstabs-officer, declared that he favoured personnel of “a military past, 
military success and military activity.”483 In particular, the police of West Berlin was 
modelled upon its predecessor, the authoritarian and all-powerful Prussian police, which was 
justified by Berlin’s special situation as an exclave within communist territory. 
 
In 5 February 1966, the FU Berlin prohibited a conference on Vietnam. The conference was 
followed by a police-authorized demonstration of 200 persons who marched in front of the 
Amerika Haus. The demonstrators threw eggs and put the US flag at half-mast. In a speech 
following the incident, the SPD mayor, Heinrich Albertz, declared: “I have clearly instructed 
the police leadership that every political rally – which in a democratic state like Berlin must 
of course be allowed – already carries the seed of illegal and rebellious exploitation by the 
communists. […] After the experiences of 5 February I have ordered that the police shall fight 
excesses and criminal actions during public rallies quickly and, if necessary, with the use of 
tough police coercion right from the beginning.”484 
 
The excessive reaction of the police to a – in terms of violence and of its political relevance – 
completely harmless event that subsequently built up to the bloodbath of 2 June 1967 was in 
part caused by Berlin’s enclave status and a fear of a communist invasion or takeover, and in 
part by the para-military and authoritarian structure of the police of Berlin. However, the fact 
that non-violent demonstrations by a rather small group in a majority of non-communist 
students were perceived as a fundamental threat to state security indicates the pre-democratic, 
authoritarian ideology behind the anti-communist fear of the authorities. The Kursbuch 
argued: “It has to be asked why the police fought against the demonstrators as if they were an 
armed, organized enemy so that they would employ the strategy they had been trained to 
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counter a civil war. This was only possible because the police misconceived the spontaneity 
of the demonstrators. They could not imagine that almost 3000 citizens would spontaneously 
gather for a rally. They suspected an organization behind the demonstration […]. They treated 
the demonstrators like an armed organization that manipulates the spontaneity of the 
protest.”485 As the chief of the police, Duensing, later had to acknowledge before a 
parliamentary inquiry board, the police had “no hints whatsoever of subversive activities by 
demonstration groups.”486 The police excesses were subsequently fully legitimized by the 
prosecutors and the judiciary, almost invariably convicting everybody who was truly or 
falsely identified as a demonstrator by the police. This close cooperation of the police and the 
judiciary is a characteristic of an authoritarian state structure. The most notable case was the 
acquittal of Karl-Heinz Kurras, the police officer who had killed Benno Ohnesorg, despite 
witness evidence.487 The court quelled all attempts by the plaintiffs to identify the politically 
responsible superiors of Kurras. 
 
Some of the terrorism laws discussed above show a rather clear connection to Germany’s pre-
democratic, authoritarian state tradition. In particular, this phenomenon becomes obvious with 
the Radikalenerlass and the Rasterfahndung. The Radikalenerlass was, as I attempted to 
show, fuelled by a traditional understanding of public servants being subordinates to the state. 
Public servants had to fully submit to the state, including their private actions and their 
political beliefs. The Rasterfahndung was, as shown, not a completely new development of 
the 60’s and the 70’s. It was, of course, made possible by new technical innovations in the 
computer sector, but was also based on a traditional, pre-democratic understanding of the 
state. Until the 80’s, it was not at all clear that public institutions had to base all their actions 
on an explicit authorization by law. Rather, there was a somewhat common understanding that 
all instruments deemed appropriate could be applied unless they were explicitly forbidden by 
law. This concept of the state also excluded any form of responsibility of the state authorities 
towards the individual, especially when it came to police and intelligence matters. Public 
institutions often worked together in the name of state interest, which was exemplified by the 
extensive use of Amtshilfe. This was also true with regard to the judiciary. Especially until the 
70’s – most notably in the Stammheim trials – the judiciary often acted not as a check on the 
                                                 
485 Peter Damerow et al. (1968), p. 18 
486 Peter Damerow et al. (1968), p. 18 
487 In 2009, historian Cornelia Jabs discovered that Kurras had been a secret collaborator of the Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit (Stasi), the DDR secret service in the 50ies and 60ies. The discovered records suggest that the 
Stasi had neither ordererd nor supported the shooting of Ohnesorg. See Helmut Müller-Enbergs und Cornelia 
Jabs: Der 2. Juni 1967 und die Staatssicherheit, in: Deutschland Archiv (2009) No. 42, p. 395; available online: 
http://www.bpb.de/themen/EIRZV5,0,Der_2_Juni_1967_und_die_Staatssicherheit.html (retrieved 4 July 2009) 
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state authorities but as their allies. Weinhauer argues that the period from 1974 to 1977 was 
the last phase in post-war history where the political elites attempted to integrate the society 
with the help of the state from above. Terrorist attacks in 1985 and 1986, he points out, did 
not lead any more to a similar state mobilization.488 
The liberalization of the state and of police matters 
 
The 70’s and 80’s are characterized by a massive liberalization movement in police matters. 
In particular, I attempted to show this in regard to the Rasterfahndung. Especially in the 80’s 
we can see the massive strengthening of the idea that the state cannot treat citizens merely as 
subordinates, but it is accountable to the individual. This becomes obvious in the growth of 
legitimization requirements that the police and intelligence apparatus becomes subject to. In 
the 50’s two of the three intelligence services were established without any legal basis. In the 
80’s, this structure was debated and questioned, and finally a proper legal basis was 
established. 
 
It was shown in the previous chapter that the police and the intelligence services often 
employed tools such the Rasterfahndung or wiretapping without a proper legal basis. I believe 
that the introduction of explicit provisions allowing these tools – especially in the late 70’s 
and the 80’s – may be to some extent necessitated by a change in how the state is perceived. 
In particular, the growth of legitimization requirements is identifiable. 
 
The growing data protection movement that evolved in the late 70’s and took off in the early 
80’s was an expression of this liberalization movement. As shown above, it was far from clear 
until then that police actions – such as the collection of data – would need to be based on 
explicit authorizing provisions. It was made clear – especially by the constitutional court’s 
decision on the census law – that state authorities increasingly came under this restraint. The 
same is true with regard to the rights of citizens:  in the 70’s citizens still had no right 
whatsoever to access, correct or delete the data that state authorities kept about them – be it 
old-fashioned record cards or modern computer entries. This right came to be established over 
the course of the 80’s. 
 
                                                 
488 Klaus Weinhauer (2006), p. 932 
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In short, the development of terrorism laws in the 70’s and 80’s exhibits an anti-authoritarian, 
liberal tendency which runs parallel – and conflicts with – the authoritarian tradition and the 
law-and-order tendencies that were equally present. 
Terrorism legislation ineffective against terrorism 
 
By and large, the terrorism legislation analyzed in this thesis has turned out to be a highly 
ineffective tool to prevent terrorism. As shown, the communication ban law has been 
completely useless, and Rasterfahndung led to one single success in over thirty years. The 
leniency law has not led to a single arrest or conviction of an active terrorist. Similarly, 
wiretapping has not led to a single arrest or conviction of a RAF terrorist. Furthermore, I have 
not found any indication that wiretapping has been successful in recent years against Islamic 
terrorism, although I have not fully validated this claim. The application of § 129a against the 
alleged sympathizer scene has had, by and large, the counter-productive result of alienating 
major parts of the radical left from the state’s struggle against the RAF. All successes against 
terrorists have been achieved by “classic” investigative methods.  
Terrorism legislation as a political instrument against the left 
 
I have tried to show in the previous chapters that terrorism legislation has to a great extent 
been employed as a political tool against the left. Three different processes are 
distinguishable. First, terrorism legislation has been employed strongly as a tool of party 
politics. Although all major parliamentary parties – the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the FDP and 
later the Greens – have passed terrorism legislation when they were in (national and regional) 
government, it seems that – as a whole – the right has benefited more from the terrorism 
discourse. Within the SPD and the FDP the terrorism issue has been an important instrument 
to delegitimize the respective left factions, an example being when the FDP’s right wing, 
represented by Wolfgang Gerhardt and Hermann Otto Solms, conducted a member poll in 
1995 to break the opposition by Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, the left-liberal minister 
of justice, to the wiretapping program.  
 
Second, terrorism legislation has been and continues to be frequently employed as a tool 
against communists, the radical and non-orthodox left and against new social movements. 
This has become particularly clear with regard to Rasterfahndung and the terrorism-paragraph 
§ 129a. Both instruments have been extensively used by the police, the intelligence services 
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and the prosecution to observe and to criminalize groups that were non-terrorist and by and 
large non-violent. By contrast, right extremist terrorists and neo-Nazis have generally not 
been targeted with the tools provided by the terrorism legislation. To some extent, this 
obvious imbalance may have been caused by an authoritarian, right wing world view of major 
parts of the public administration and the judiciary. However, it is important to note that 
security legislation has also been frequently employed by the SPD against the radical and 
non-conformist left. 
 
Third, in the 60’s and 70’s a world view prevailed that criminality – and also terrorism – was 
a symptom of a dysfunctional social structure. Alcoholism, poverty but also insufficient social 
and moral structures were among the causes identified. It was believed that meticulous social 
engineering based on detailed social control could solve these problems. For this reason, 
security- and terrorism-related instruments targeted groups that were perceived as socially 
deviant and thus a likely breeding ground for criminality and terrorism.  
Terrorism laws are almost never repealed 
 
Most of the measures analyzed in this thesis have been subject to a strong normalization 
process. Measures having entered the legal system mostly became very persistent. 
Subsequently, attempts to remove the provisions have been largely ineffective or necessitated 
a major political effort. This finding completely invalidates the argument that terrorism 
legislation is only made for times of crisis and will be removed once the threat subsides. 
 
Moreover, adopted terrorism measures tend to shape the way people understand or 
conceptualize terrorism. The communication ban law (Kontaktsperregesetz) provides the most 
obvious (though not the most important) example. Although it has only been employed once, 
it nevertheless has defied a repeal until this day. The Kontaktsperregesetz has continued to 
shape the public debate, substantiating the argument that civil rights of suspects may be 
reduced in times of crisis. 
 
It also became obvious in the previous chapter that most instruments initially conceived to 
counter terrorism were later transformed into general police tools against “regular” crime. A 
shift that was particularly visible took place in the mid-80’s, when the focus of the security 
debate shifted from terrorism to drugs and then to organized crime. Most of the provisions 
analyzed in the previous chapters were expanded from the 80’s to the 90’s to organized crime. 
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§ 129a was massively expanded in the 80’s mainly to criminalize militant groups connected to 
the new social movements. Another example of the persistency of a security-related provision 
is the Radikalenerlass. Only a few years after its conception Willy Brandt called it a 
“mistake”. However, it took until the 90’s to abolish the decree and stop its application.  
Institutional conflict and a non-monolithic conception of the state 
 
Another aspect of terrorism legislation that became obvious in the preceding chapters is that 
there was no monolithic state pushing through its security interests. Rather, the historic 
development of terrorism legislation and its application is (to some extent) the result of 
conflicting interests and operating modes within the state. The most obvious institutional 
conflict is the conflict between the federal government, on the one side, and the opposition 
(including the Bundesländer controlled by the opposition), on the other. Implementing or 
calling for “tough” anti-terrorism and anti-crime measures was employed in public discourse 
to show that the government takes care of (or doesn’t take enough care of) the population’s 
safety. The political system of Germany – having strong regions with broad competences in 
police matters – also created specific dynamics: the different federal institutions (the federal 
prosecutor, the BKA, the Bundesgrenzschutz, the federal government) competed with the 
institutions of the Bundesländer (such as the regional police forces and the regional 
prosecutors) for hegemony. This was shown in the previous chapter with regard to the BKA, a 
federal agency that could acquire new competences and personnel especially during the peak 
of anti-terrorism activities in the mid- and late 70’s. Another dynamic in the history of 
terrorism laws caused by the federal structure of Germany was that many new police 
competences were first developed and applied in one or some of the Bundesländer, often 
going unnoticed by the media and critics who focussed on debates on national level.  
 
I have mentioned that the legal initiatives by the governments and their application by the 
police and the judiciary were often perceived by the left as being partial. Critics pointed out 
on numerous occasions that the public agencies exhibited a much lower level of commitment 
in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by right-extremist groups (including 
crimes committed by the SS or the Einsatzgruppen) than they did when it came to left and 
left-extremist groups. I attempted to show that some of the provisions – most notably the 
Extremistenerlass and § 129a – had the effect of criminalizing broad segments of the activist 
left. To some extent this phenomenon can reasonably be described as an institutional conflict 
as well. The social movements emerging in the early 80’s, that were targeted by the police 
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and the judiciary, confronted public authorities by rejecting some of their main projects – e.g. 
the growing use of nuclear power, rearmament, an aggressive policy towards the communist 
bloc – and by using political instruments circumventing and disempowering the traditional 
political and economic elites. The continued attempt to quell social movements with the help 
of anti-terrorism legislation seems to be a power conflict within the broader sphere of 
democratic politics. 
 
The metaphor of the “monolithic state” has been employed both by advocates and adversaries 
of the terrorism laws in the past decades. The images of the “strong state” and of “democracy 
being able to defend itself” (wehrhafte Demokratie) were employed to legitimize broad 
terrorism measures. By contrast, metaphors of the almighty state, of the “surveillance state”, 
the authoritarian state or of the “fascist state” were employed to rally critics. Both discourses 
try to create a dichotomy that attempts to legitimize its own position and to force people to 
take sides. It is reasonable to see these two lines of argument not only as two competing 
interpretations of terrorism in Germany but as discourses serving a political purpose. I 
attempted to show that the history of terrorism laws in Germany may be described as the 
result of the dynamics within a non-monolithic state where different parties and agencies 
pursue different, sometimes conflicting goals. 
Final remarks 
 
The thesis attempts to close a gap in research with regard to the development of terrorism 
laws and to how this development interacts with the terrorism discourse, the security debate 
and the political development in Germany in general. However, more research in this field 
seems to be necessary. On a general level, a further systematization of the history of security-
related legislation would seem highly useful.  
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Abstract 
 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit behandelt die Entwicklung von Terrorismusgesetzen in 
Deutschland von den Siebzigern bis in die Gegenwart. Die Diplomarbeit basiert auf der 
Grundannahme, dass die Entwicklung dieses Rechtsgebiets– wie bereits vielfach festgestellt 
wurde – als Diskurs zu verstehen ist. Dieser Terrorismusdiskurs strukturiert sowohl die 
öffentliche Diskussion als auch die Rechtsentwicklung. Der Terrorismusdiskurs ist nach wie 
vor von einer Auseinandersetzung über die Deutungshoheit geprägt.  
 
Gegenstand der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die ausführliche und detaillierte Analyse der 
Entwicklung der wichtigsten Terrorismusgesetze, die seit den 70ern – also dem Beginn des 
RAF-Terrorismus in Deutschland – bis zur Gegenwart erlassen wurden. Dies basiert auf der 
Annahme, dass sich Terrorismusgesetze unterhalb der durch den Terrorismusdiskurs 
geprägten Ebene vielfach auf Arten entwickeln und verändern, die den herrschenden 
Deutungsschemen nur bedingt entsprechen.  
 
In der Diplomarbeit werden sechs Regelungsfelder in ihrer Entwicklung analysiert: 
Kontaktsperregesetz, Kronzeugenregelung, Lauschangriff, Rasterfahndung, das strafrechtliche 
Verbot der Bildung terroristischer Vereinigungen (§ 129a StGB) sowie der Radikalenerlass. 
 
Im Schlusskapitel wird versucht, die Entwicklung dieser sechs Regelungbereiche zu 
vergleichen und breitere Entwicklungsströme zu erkennen. Dabei wird unter anderem 
herausgearbeitet, dass im Untersuchungszeitraum zwei – sich primär widersprechende – 
Entwicklungen zu erkennen sind: einerseits die Fortsetzung einer vordemokratischen, 
autoritären Staatsauffassung, andererseits die Liberalisierung der Hoheitsgewalt, welcher sich 
etwa im Bereich des Datenschutzes nachweisen lässt.  
Lebenslauf 
 
Name:  Mag. iur. Clemens Kaupa 
 
Geburtsdatum: 7. Oktober 1981 
 
Ausbildung: 1987 – 1991  Volksschule Mondweg, Wien XIV 
 1991 – 1999  Realgymnasium Astgasse, Wien XIV 
 1999 – 2009  Studium Geschichte, Universität Wien 
 2000 – 2007  Studium Rechtswissenschaften, Universität Wien 
 2007 Promotion zum Magister iuris 
 2007 Inskription Doktorat Rechtswissenschaften,  
  Universität Wien 
  
